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External Dynamics of Democratization and the Arab Spring 
Is it the Region’s Sisyphean Curse? 
 
Ghina A. Harb 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
The Arab uprisings have unleashed a wave of authoritarian regime breakdowns in a 
number of Arab states. Students of Arab politics are consequently examining how 
the Arab world fits with existing democratic transition paradigms. The main causal 
variables used in these paradigms pertain to domestic dynamics, however. Yet post-
authoritarian regime breakdown dynamics in the Arab world underscore the role of 
external variables in subsequent democratic transitions. Taking Libya and Bahrain as 
case studies, this thesis unpacks the role of these external variables. It takes external 
dynamics as the independent variable and, concomitantly, regime breakdown or 
maintenance as the dependent variable. A number of indicators are operationalized in 
a comparative examination of the two cases. The thesis argues that external 
dynamics are a double-edged sword: they play a determining role in Arab Spring 
uprisings, either in the direction of authoritarian regime breakdown or persistence. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1- Introduction 
This thesis will explore the role of the external context on prospects for 
democratization after the recent Arab uprisings. Academic and policy specialists have 
long debated various approaches in an attempt to find which factor explains best 
democratic transitions. Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter (1986) drew 
their answers from the importance of the elites’ idiosyncratic calculations.  Larry 
Diamond, Juan Linz, and Seymour Lipset (1989) emphasized the importance of 
structural facets in developing explanations for specific countries’ mode of transition. 
Moreover, Staffan Lindberg (2009) examined democratization from the lens of 
repeated contested elections. Lindberg re-visits elections as a causal variable for 
democratization. These explanations of democratic transitions focus mainly on 
internal factors. On the other hand, this thesis will contribute to the democratization 
debate by highlighting the importance of a fourth paradigm in the study of 
democratization: the role of external variables in democratic transitions. Taking 
Bahrain and Libya as case studies, and unpacking the role of the external 
(international and regional) context, this thesis examines an overlooked transition 
paradigm in the study of democratization process in the Arab world. 
Democratization does not necessitate preliminary requirements such as nation-
building or vibrant civil society (Whitehead 2002). However, when theorizing about 
the applicability of democratization, there are various challenges and “part of the 
challenge of democratization is that every nation that has already made the journey 
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seems to have followed a somewhat different path, and there is no set process for 
building a democracy” (Pollack et al. 2011: 88). Nevertheless, Stephen Grand argues 
that “democratization is not easy, and it is not quick. To glimpse where the politics of 
the Middle East may travel, the best guide is the experience of other regions of the 
world that have gone down the path of democratic reform” (Grand in Pollack et al. 
2011: 21). Resilient to the waves of democratization, the authoritarian regimes of the 
Middle East were and are the center of scholarly debates. From co-optation, neo-
patrimonialism, clientalism, and non-accountability methods of Arab politics, the 
theories of Middle Eastern exceptionalism revolved around political culture, the black 
gold curse, colonial legacies, and the robustness of coercive apparatuses.  
Nevertheless, the examination of the role of domestic variables in instigating 
democratic transitions has been overly debated. From arguments of O’Donnell and 
Schmitter, Diamond, Linz, and Lipset, to Staffan Lindberg, the major paradigms have 
revolved around the role of idiosyncratic calculations of elites, the structure of the 
state, and repeated elections. Therefore, it is only through revisiting the old and 
historical assumptions regarding Middle Eastern exceptionalism and the major 
paradigms of democratic transition that, we, scholars and practitioners, who witnessed 
the Arab Spring, can learn from precedential assumptions. “The vast intertwined 
problems of the Arab world will not magically disappear when the old regimes fall 
and new ones take their places” (Pollack et al. 2011: 61), but it is fundamental to 
highlight the role of external variables- as a mode of transition paradigm- in the Arab 
Spring.  
In a pre-Bouazizi Arab world, few social movements occurred that were 
merely short-lived. The 1987-1989 social movements that transpired across Middle 
Eastern countries - Algeria, Lebanon, Morocco, Jordan, and Egypt - were brought to 
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an end through coercive measures and promised reforms.  On the other hand, “the 
political developments of the post-2010 period are unprecedented in their depth and 
breadth” (Brand 2013: 1).  At the end of 2010, Arabs decided to celebrate 2011 in 
their own way. Making the MENA region a hotbed of defiance, the long-ruled leaders 
of the Middle East were challenged in an unparalleled and exceptional manner. “[The] 
furious sense of grievance across the Arab world that finally boiled over in the winter 
and spring of 2011” (Pollack et al. 2011: 2) is unprecedented in both its taken course 
of action and its outcome.  
Moreover, “the current wave of political unrest in the Arab world has shown 
once again the difficulties of predicting complex socio-political events” (Behr 2012: 
18). The Arab Spring was not only unprecedented in its depth but also in the level and 
rate of the role of external variables, which was fundamental in shifting the course of 
political transitions. Almost two and a half years after the self-imolation of the 
Tunisian Bouazizi, “the tremors [of Arab discontent] can still be felt, and no one is 
quite certain when the aftershocks will end, or when another shock wave of popular 
unrest might occur” (Pollack et al. 2011: 1) 
With the exception of Bahrain, the regimes mostly affected by waves of Arab 
discontent were not monarchies. However, “on a more political level, we really need 
to understand the collective, interconnected reactions of Saudi Arabia and other GCC 
monarchies and billionaires to events across the region and in individual instances 
(Libya, Egypt, Bahrain, Yemen, and Syria) including secretive financial channels as 
well as official policy positions and backing for some parties against others” 
(Carapico 2012: 17). Not only is the role of Saudi Arabia in the Bahraini unrest an 
important variable in examining the variation in the impact of external dynamics but 
also NATO’s intervention in Libya under the umbrella of humanitarian intervention is 
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fundamental. Since its inception in 2005, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) had 
never been implemented through a Security Council resolution.  The UN Security 
Council Resolution 1973 was pioneering not only in authorizing NATO’s intervention 
in Libya but also in adopting R2P as a fundamental norm for avoiding a Libyan 
massacre.  
Daniel Byman and Kenneth Pollack argue that “the impact of the Arab Spring 
reaches far beyond the countries in transition, and perhaps no outside powers are 
more affected than those that border the Arab world. They are fast finding that -
through geography, history, national interests, or ideology - the Arab Spring is 
reshaping the region in which we live” (Byman & Pollack in Pollack et al. 2011: 243). 
Studying the varied role of regional and international response in Libya and Bahrain 
highlights the role of external dynamics in promoting regime maintenance and in 
orchestrating regime breakdown. Throughout the events of Arab discontent, it was 
evident that the United States had a less of an active role because “the United States’ 
strategic involvement in the Middle East is rooted in two sources: a hegemonic 
interest in secure and stable oil markets, and an overarching ideological commitment 
to the state of Israel that is reinforced by significant domestic pressures” (Kitchen 
2012: 53). The interim result after any revolt or uprising is precarious. As the Middle 
East approaches the third year of the 2010 events, Libya faces concrete challenges in 
terms of control, security, and legitimacy whereas Bahrainis remain in a disenchanted 
discontent every now and then.  
 
1.2- Research Question 
The Arab world is known for its vulnerability to external interference. The 
effect of the external dynamics on the Middle East have resonated across the years, 
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“as was the case before the end of the Cold War, the regional and international 
environment have been an omnipresent factor in the decision-making of Middle East 
regimes” (Brynen, Moore, Salloukh, & Zahar 2012: 278). Nevertheless, the strategic 
role of external factors has continued to play an important role after the end of the 
Cold War. When the waves of Arab uprisings gradually started to spread across the 
region, the regional and international reactions towards the Arab Spring varied. 
Taking Libya and Bahrain as case studies and the historical sociology approach as a 
theoretical framework, helps to explain the role played by external variables in 
determining authoritarian regime breakdown or maintenance. Placing the external 
variables as the independent variable and the dependent variable as regime breakdown 
or regime maintenance, a number of variables can then be operationalized, including 
oil, geopolitical location, alliances, and foreign policy. Examining the two case 
studies comparatively, the research question thus becomes: What explains variations 
in the impact of external variables on authoritarian regime breakdown or 
maintenance? 
 
1.3- Methodology  
Relying on historians as a source of information provides a good basis for 
understanding the past; nevertheless, it is not the only solution. Overemphasizing the 
past prevents us from offering viable explanations of the present. Therefore, aside 
from using an eclectic approach for understanding and interpreting different concepts 
and assumptions, Fred Halliday’s (2005) international historical sociology is used in 
this thesis. The international historical sociology method is a dynamic approach that 
opens up major historical matters. This approach lists the state, ideology, society, and 
institutions (political, social, and religious) as core components within its framework.  
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Analysis of the state from a perspective of internal state-society relations and external 
state-state relation is the two level operation of historical sociology.  
The two case studies in this thesis are Libya and Bahrain. After the uprisings 
in Tunisia and Egypt overturned Ben Ali and Mubarak respectively, massive social 
unrest spread across Libya. However, unlike Tunisia and Egypt, the brigades known 
as thuwar in Libya were assisted in their campaign against Qaddafi. The North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO, led a seven-month bombing campaign in Libya. 
Analysis of the major military forces within NATO shows that the major forces are 
former colonial powers in Africa. On February 2012, the Libyans marked the 
anniversary of the uprising that led to the overthrow of Muammar Qaddafi’s forty-
year rule. On the other hand, the Bahraini uprising started in February 2011, the first 
protests in an oil-rich country in the Gulf. The peaceful uprising in Manama was 
short-lived, however. With the authorization of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Saudi 
Arabian troops crossed into Bahrain in a joint-force to support the regime against the 
uprising. Formed in 1981 as a security and economic cooperation among the Gulf 
countries against the threat of the Persian neighbor, the GCC played a significant role 
in smashing the uprising in Bahrain.  
During the Arab uprising, the adversarial balance of power was manipulated 
for the maintenance of the authoritarian regime, as in the case of Bahrain. However, 
in the case of Libya, the external variable played a positive role in shifting the 
situation towards breaking down the authoritarian regime of Qaddafi. Therefore, in 
the two cases, Libya and Bahrain, the external variable tilted the dynamics of power 
distribution within the respective states. 
The Middle Eastern interconnected populist movement in demand of change is 
a new phenomenon. What has happened? What are the common problems between 
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Middle Eastern countries? Are the reasons related to economic deficiency? Or is it the 
lack of legitimacy and trust between the ruled and the ruling? Whilst acknowledging 
that each country differs in its historical, political, economic, and social environment, 
this thesis will examine the case of Libya and Bahrain. Therefore, this thesis will 
compare the case of Libya and Bahrain in light of international historical sociology in 
order to assess the difference in the role of the external variable on regime change.  A 
number of variables are operationalized: oil, geopolitical location, alliances, and 
foreign policy.  
Relevant secondary data ranging from books to scholarly articles has been 
collected, analyzed, and interpreted. In an attempt to formulate tentative conclusions 
concerning the overlooked paradigm, the external context, and its role in regime 
change, various assumptions, concepts, and hypotheses in relation to the issue of 
democratization will be explained.  
There have been various works concerning the issue of democracy and 
democratic transitions. Nevertheless, the issue of democratization is a study that 
entails different dimensions. This thesis will re-visit the study of democratization in 
light of the Arab uprisings that occurred in 2010 in the Middle East.  The Arab 
Awakening known as the Arab Spring is still a recent phenomenon, and many events 
are still unstably changing in cases of study such as Egypt, Syria, Tunisia, Libya, 
Yemen, and Bahrain. Democracy and democratization are two key concepts that 
cannot but be explained differently among scholars and practitioners (Whitehead 
2002). In this thesis, the definition of democratization illustrated by Whitehead will 
be adopted. Whitehead believes that democratization is not the process that begins 
after ousting dictators and ends by competitive elections; democratization is a long 
and dynamic process of social construction. 
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1.4- Map of the Thesis 
This thesis is divided into five chapters. After introducing the topic that the 
thesis examines, the second chapter examines the three main transition paradigms, 
elites’ idiosyncratic calculations, structural aspects, and elections, and then introduces 
the external context as a fourth paradigm. The third chapter applies the case of Libya 
to the causality of the international framework that will lead for a better understanding 
of how the external variables lead to authoritarian regime breakdown. The fourth 
chapter assesses how the external variables lead to authoritarian regime maintenance, 
as in the case of Bahrain. The last chapter is a summary of the previous chapters 
whilst offering the results of the debated transition paradigms in the Arab world.   
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CHAPTER TWO 
RECONSIDERING AN OVERLOOKED 
TRANSITION PARADIGM 
“Democratization can be imagined and attempted in all corners 
of the globe” - Laurence Whitehead 
 
2.1-  Introduction 
In light of identifying insurmountable domestic obstacles in the face of 
democratization, much has been written to explain the persistence of authoritarianism 
in Arab politics. Scholars and practitioners argue that for some time before the Arab 
Spring, “much of the scholarly attention […] shifted from trying to understand the 
potential sources of reform in the Middle East to trying to understand the roots of 
authoritarian persistence in the region” (Brynen, Moore, Salloukh, & Zahar 2012: 7). 
The studies of Arab states focused on the regimes’ mechanism to co-opt and contain 
popular opposition (Gause 2011). As much as scholarly works shifted towards 
building theories of authoritarian persistence, “we in the academic community made 
assumptions that, as valid as they might have been in the past, turned out to be wrong 
in 2011” (Gause 2011: 82). Therefore, no one in the academic community predicted 
the Arab uprisings that started in December 2010. Nevertheless, when the uprisings in 
the Middle East occurred, many observers discussed optimistically the possibility of 
witnessing a new phenomenon in the region, a phenomenon whereby power can 
finally be by the people and for the people. Sovereignty and self-determination 
became fantasized notions ready to be realistically depicted in the Arab world through 
street protests that spread gradually from Tunisia on 18 December 2010 to Egypt, 
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Libya, Syria, Bahrain, and Yemen. “Democracy, after all, means rule by the people” 
(Shedler in Lindberg 2009: 315) and although dictators in authoritarian countries such 
as Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, were overthrown, question marks still persists about the 
possibility of democratization in the Arab world.  
Democracy and democratization are two key concepts that cannot but be 
explained differently among scholars and practitioners (Whitehead 2002). Therefore, 
democratization is not the process that begins after ousting dictators and ends by 
competitive elections; it is a long and dynamic process of social construction whereas 
“democracy is best understood not as a predetermined end-state, but as a long-term 
and somewhat open-ended outcome, not just as a feasible equilibrium but as a socially 
desirable and imaginary future” (Whitehead 2002: 3). An overlooked transition 
paradigm in the study of democratization is the role of external variables. Several 
democratization transition paradigms have been discussed; however, all the variables 
analyzed in the causal relation have focused on internal dynamics. Therefore, the 
focus and priority should be towards “the analysis of the conditions that lead to the 
breakdown of authoritarian regimes, to the process of transition from authoritarian to 
democratic regimes” (Linz and Stepan 1978: ix). Today, thirty-five years after Linz 
and Stepan’s argument, the process of democratic transition leading to regime 
breakdown or regime maintenance should be highlighted as a priority in the study of 
democratization. 
This chapter identifies three major transition paradigms in the study of 
democratization. It analyzes these transition paradigms and then categorizes them as 
explanations of democratic transitions focusing mainly on internal factors. The 
chapter lists and examines the major explanations of the Arab world’s resistance to 
democratic transitions in terms of internal and external variables. Nevertheless, the 
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chapter’s main focus is to contribute to the democratization debate by highlighting an 
overlooked fourth transition paradigm in the study of democratization: the role of 
external variables in democratic transitions. 
 
2.2- Resistance to Democratic Transition 
Many scholars have attempted to explain the persistence of authoritarianism in 
the Middle East using various variables. Political culture, rentierism, security, gender 
inequality, colonial legacy, coercive agencies, and many other variables have been 
used to explain the impediments to democracy in the Middle East. Nevertheless, 
many scholars missed predicting the massive uprisings that started in Tunisia on 18 
December 2010.  
These explanations of the Arab world’s resistance to democratic transitions 
focus mainly on internal factors. In an age where democratic and liberal values are the 
trend, why has the authoritarian regimes in the Arab world been resistant to change? 
Deploying a political culture explanation of Arab politics, many scholars have not 
appropriately used this approach (Hudson 1995). With authoritarianism being the 
primary variable to be examined, explanations were and are still given in terms of 
three main approaches: socioeconomic, socio-cultural, and institutional. Believing 
that political culture is a pivotal variable necessary for explaining important aspects of 
Arab politics, Hudson argued for the need to carefully bring back the political culture 
approach is a must (Hudson 1995). He suggested that bringing back a sophisticatedly 
empirical political culture based on close behavioral examination and less cultural 
generalization is very important for understanding conditions such as democracy and 
legitimacy in the Arab world (Hudson 1995). 
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On the other hand, it is important to shed light on the negative consequences 
to the study of Arab politics due to political culture explanations (Anderson 1995). In 
an attempt to prove the fallacies of this approach, attitudes compatible with 
democracy are a mere result of adaptation to democratic institutions and social 
transformations (Anderson 1995). Therefore, explaining the absence of democracy by 
invoking the presence of patrimonial patterns, Islam, violence, or the presence of 
something else is no longer acceptable. Nevertheless, with the absence of democracy 
in the Arab world remarkably shining more than ever, the nature of regimes in the 
Arab world cannot be understood fully except through analyzing their political 
economy (Anderson 1995). The context of political economy can be depicted as an 
internal or an external variable; however, the character of integration of Arab states 
into the world economy serves as an important external variable for understanding the 
non-democratic nature of Arab regimes. 
In an attempt to answer the question as to why the MENA region has been 
resistant to change, Eva Bellin argues that it is neither cultural nor socio-economic 
factors that have made the region exceptionally resistant to democratic transition 
(Bellin 2005). The coercive aptitude of the state offers a proper explanation in terms 
of why there has been limited popular mobilization in demand for democratic 
reforms. In contrast to what Lisa Anderson argues, Bellin highlights the fact that it is 
not the absence of cultural and socioeconomic pre-requisites that has made the 
MENA exceptional to democracy, rather it is the robustness of their institutions 
(Bellin 2005). In a reconsidered article, Bellin argues that the coercive aptitude of the 
states is an important variable in determining the variation in repressing popular 
protests (Bellin 2012). Nevertheless, the Arab Spring proved the exceptional 
arguments of regimes’ coercive robustness as a falsifiable variable. In a moment of 
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outrageous defiance, authoritarian regimes’ tactics for self-preservation could not 
withhold the demands of populist movements.   
Moreover, many scholars have tried to distance themselves from examining 
the role of oil as an impediment to democracy in some Middle Eastern countries. The 
nature of the ruling families and regime strategy has had a role in impeding 
democratization in the Middle East and North Africa. In order to explain monarchical 
survival and the failure of democratization in the Middle East, one must look at the 
nature and the role of monarchical families (Herb 1999). Therefore, the family 
coalition in ruling the state is what best explains the resilience of the monarchical 
regimes in the Middle East (Herb 1999). Control of state institutions by the ruling 
family is the type of regime known as dynastic monarchy. Herb argues that all 
dynastic monarchies in the Middle East are resilient to change (Herb 1999). 
Nevertheless, the dynastic monarchies of the Middle East such as Bahrain, Saudi 
Arabia, Jordan, and Morocco have proved Herb’s causality for regimes’ resilience to 
change as wrong. Despite the fact that the uprisings in the monarchical regimes of the 
Middle East- with the exception of Bahrain- have illustrated multiple sets of variables 
for maintenance of regime stability and security, most notably, the regime’s tactics to 
crush protestors.   
Therefore, various domestic variables were endorsed as explanations for the 
Arab world’s resistance to democratization. There are a number of variables that 
many scholars tried to use in order to explain why some Middle Eastern monarchies 
failed and others not (Herb 1999). Hazem Beblawi used the factor of oil revenues to 
explain survival strategies of monarchies (Beblawi 1999). Other scholars used the 
level of opposition, level of education, power of the army, foreign powers’ protection, 
and the existence of parliaments to explain regime survival (Herb 1999). However, 
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refuting all of these explanations in understanding what makes monarchies resilient is 
essential (Herb 1999). Herb contends that family succession, family coalition/unity, 
and factors of non-accountability and clientelistic relation between state and society 
are features explaining the dynastic monarchies’ resilience for change (Herb 1999). 
However, Muammar Qaddafi’s techniques of repression, censorship, and corruption 
did not withhold the Libyans from revolting against him. Akram Al Turk argue, 
“when the Arab Spring swept across Libya, pulling thousands of frustrated people 
into the streets, including key tribal leaders and defectors from the regime, the 
revolution was strong enough to immediately cause the collapse of the weak Libyan 
state, but not enough to immediately oust Qaddafi and his loyalists altogether” (Al 
Turk in Pollack et al. 2011: 119). Therefore, with an international intervention 
through NATO, the battle’s outcome was tipped in favor of the populist protestors 
and this proved that oil wealth could not buy Qaddafi his regime stability.  
From political culture, the robustness of coercive institutions, family 
coalitions, the black gold curse, to levels of state control, internal variables were 
usually offered as explanations to understand the persistence of authoritarianism in 
the Middle East. Nevertheless, after around twenty-five years from the most modern 
political transformation in Eastern Europe, Africa, and Asia - that featured extensive 
civil opposition against single party rule system - the lack of reform potentiality in the 
Middle East is still being explained in terms of internal contexts. For example, Valerie 
Bunce and Sharon Wolchik illustrated that “with the help of particularly intensive 
international democracy assistance, the attraction of European Union membership, 
and more capable civil societies, the East European countries have largely fared well, 
becoming both successful capitalist economies and relatively democratic in two 
waves of electoral revolutions” (Lindberg 2009: 4). Therefore, the role of external 
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variables as a mode of transition has been extensively overlooked in the study of 
democratization in the Arab world. A double-edged sword, external dynamics as a 
mode of transition can be a factor both in democratization and in the persistence of 
authoritarianism. 
 
2.3- Transition Paradigms in the Study of Democratization 
Academic and policy specialists have long debated various approaches in an 
attempt to find which factor explains best democratic transitions. One of the first 
books in any language that methodically and comparatively focused on the 
transitional process from authoritarian regimes is that of Guillermo O’Donnell, 
Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead (1986). Whilst asking questions about 
the transition process in Latin American and Southern European countries, 
O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead draw their answers from the importance of the 
elites’ idiosyncratic calculations. Depicting the nested game between internal and 
external factors, Whitehead argued that “in all peacetime cases … internal forces were 
of primary importance in determining the course and outcome of the transition 
attempt, and international factors played only a secondary role” (O’Donnell, 
Schmitter, & Whitehead 1986: 4). Focusing on the importance of elites’ perception 
paradigm, and refusing to accept the argument that there are economic and social pre-
requisites for democratization, the most important key during democratic transition 
process is the “role of elite interaction and strategic choice” (Schmitter 2010: 18). 
On the other hand, a second transition paradigm is offered by Larry Diamond, 
Juan Linz, and Seymour Lipset, who emphasize the importance of structural facets in 
developing explanations for specific countries’ mode of transition (Diamond, Linz, & 
Lipset 1989). Moreover, maintaining democracy would require “an authoritative, 
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effective state, but there is often tension between authority and control, between 
capacity and domination” (Diamond, Linz, & Lipset 1989: 27). Through its strong 
institutions, the state’s ability to maintain and expand public order is the most 
important determinant of democratic stability. Nevertheless, the two fundamental 
features of state structure is the ability to intervene and control its economy 
(Diamond, Linz, & Lipset 1989). Agreeing with the arguments presented twenty-three 
years ago, “institutions are particularly important because they reflect and embed 
social realities, as well as enabling and constraining the social and political choices 
that actors have within political systems” (Brynen, Moore, Salloukh, & Zahar 2012: 
9).  
Moreover, a third transition paradigm is offered by Staffan Lindberg, who 
believe that democratization is best looked upon from the lens of repeated contested 
elections (Lindberg 2009). Basing his arguments on the countries that experienced the 
third wave of democratization, Lindberg re-visits elections as a causal variable for 
democratization whereby he asserts that “elections are not only indicators but also a 
mode of transition themselves, whereby electoral processes and incentives under 
certain conditions play causal roles in furthering democratization” (Lindberg 2009: 
xxi). But does repeated elections as a causal variable always leads to democratization? 
The three major indicators for the democratic quality of elections in a country are the 
level of participation, competition, and legitimacy (Lindberg 2009). Therefore, the 
major argument advocated is that the more elections are held, the more the society 
and the regime becomes democratic, and “Ghana’s recent political history […] 
displays a best case scenario in which a series of five transitions from one type of 
regime to another eventually led to a liberal democracy” (Lindberg 2009: 15).  
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There are various theories of transition paradigms that suggest important 
causal variables in the study of democratization. Nevertheless, elites’ perceptions, 
state structures, and elections have been listed as three major causal variables in the 
study of democratization that offer explanations of democratic transitions focusing 
mainly on internal factors. The role of actors and institutions has been configured to 
be the most important contributor and impediment to transition processes. However, 
just as elites’ idiosyncratic calculations, state structure, and elections can be viewed as 
a mode of transition for democratization, they can be viewed as factors leading to 
authoritarianism. 
It is true that elite’s perceptions offer important explanations of prospects for 
democracy; however, they cannot be excluded from the geopolitical location, 
domestic political composition, and history of the country examined. The case of 
Portugal in 1975 and the Dominican Republic in 1978 are exemplary examples how a 
mild impulse from the outside can and might impact the transition process to tip the 
outcome in one way or another (O’Donnell, Schmitter, & Whitehead 1986). 
Moreover, arguing in contradiction of the theory of elections as a mode of democratic 
transition, Jennifer McCoy and Jonathan Hartlyn contended, “there is considerable 
evidence that simply holding elections under authoritarianism does not necessarily 
foster democratization” (Lindberg 2009: 47). 
 
2.4- A Fourth Transition Paradigm 
Few explanations of the Arab world’s democratic transition deficit focus on 
the role of external variables. Scholars such as Basilios Tsingos argued that, “the role 
of international factors in the democratization process has become the focus of 
considerable scholarly attention in the wake of the events in Eastern Europe in 1989” 
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(Whitehead 1996: 315). Moreover, the explanations invoking international factor have 
focused on either democracy promotion or on the effects of democratization in 
countries neighboring authoritarian regimes (Whitehead 2002). Many scholars and 
practitioners anticipated democratic transitions to occur in the wake of the end of the 
Cold War. It was only in the aftermath of the events of 9/11 that international pressure 
on incumbents in Arab authoritarian regimes led to minor political transformation 
such as allowing multiparty elections. Oliver Schlumberger asserted that, “the mode 
of governance in the Arab world is of prime importance in the post-911 world 
because of its direct relevance to international peace and security and to the relations 
of Western governments with their Arab counterparts” (Schlumberger 2007: 1). 
Among the fifteen findings that Schmitter identifies as lessons for 
democratization over the last twenty-five years, he asserts that the time, mode, and 
result of the transition are determined notably by the international context (Schmitter 
2010). Therefore, the basis for the causality of the international context is variably 
different according to “the size, resource base, regional context, geostrategic location, 
and alliance structure of the country involved” (Schmitter 2010: 27).  
Among the six monarchies in the Middle East, Bahrain was the only one that 
witnessed major social upheavals. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Kuwait 
witnessed minor social movements, which faded before they even started. As for 
Qatar, its peaceful and homogenous environment remained isolated from the domino 
effect of the Arab Spring. So what explains the resilience of these regimes? Oil wealth 
should not be an excuse to dismiss the possibility of democracy in the Middle East 
(Herb 2005). Nevertheless, the importance of regional factors in explaining the 
persistence of authoritarianism in the Middle East should not be avoided. The cases of 
Libya and Bahrain illustrate that oil wealth is not an impediment for breaking walls of 
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fear and repression. Nevertheless, both cases show how the regional and international 
variables impact the outcome of populist uprisings in demand for reform.  
Furthermore, the distinctiveness of the Middle East as a regime type is 
attributed to regime strategy (Gause 2000). The survival of monarchy as a regime 
type in the Middle East cannot be attributed to domestic political culture factors such 
as Islam and tribalism. Islam and tribalism are factors shared by countries where 
monarchy as a regime type has failed and in others have survived. Therefore, the 
position of the Arabian Peninsula in the regional security system and the international 
political economy are one of the most important external factors to examine. 
Nevertheless, foreign power assistance and oil revenues guarantee protection and act 
as an asset to domestic usages (Gause 2000). Despite that oil wealth has allowed the 
fragile monarchical regimes in the Middle East to surmount all regional and domestic 
obstacles, the rentier state theory does not make rentier states immune from the 
democratization syndrome (Gause 2000). Therefore, with different range of 
interactions, “many years of authoritarian persistence in the Arab world are best 
explained as the result of the catalytic and synergistic interactions among a set of 
variables operating at different levels” (Brynen, Moore, Salloukh, & Zahar 2012: 
289).   
In a pioneering study, Pete Moore believes that academics and policy 
specialists have analyzed democratization in the Arab world by approaching the 
internal/national level through concentrating on state-society relations and 
institutional dynamics (Moore 1994). In the 1980s and 1990s, research on 
democratization and the modes of transit-ology centered on the role of internal 
variables; on the contrary, Moore highlights the positive and negative role played by 
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the external factor, regional and international, in hindering or inviting democratization 
in Arab world (Moore 1994).  
Moreover, external factors have exhibited primary influence on Middle 
Eastern regimes in three respects: on-going conflict, democracy promotion, and 
spread of Islamism (Brynen, Moore, Salloukh, & Zahar 2012). As for the case of 
democracy promotion, it is one of the methods adopted for achieving specific foreign 
policy objectives (Whitehead 1996). With vast history of democracy promotion, 
“Washington needs to recognize that democracy promotion is as much a political as a 
technical endeavor” (Grand in Pollack et al. 2011: 28). The United States of America 
has practiced democracy promotion in almost three extreme examples of democracy 
imposition: through invasion, through incorporation, and through intimidation 
(Whitehead 1996). Therefore, democracy promotion is one of the methods used for 
influencing democratization; however, the successful establishment of 
democratization in the Middle East “will depend in good measure on the existence of 
public demand for reform and democracy” (Grand in Pollack et al. 2011: 26). 
In an attempt to answer the riddle of the Arab world’s democratic deficit, there 
are three crucial factors that lead to either democracy enforcement or the isolation of 
autocratic regimes: geopolitics, oil, and domestic political structure (Diamond 2010). 
The dissemination of threat from the on-going Arab-Israeli conflict and from 
neighboring Arab states is a major factor verifying authoritarianism (Diamond 2010). 
Whilst conceding to the role of regional context argument by Diamond, the Middle 
East is “not only […] characterized by high permeability, but it is also afflicted with 
considerable levels of regional conflict” (Brynen, Moore, Salloukh, & Zahar 2012: 
257). Therefore, the development of armed forces as an effect caused by conflicts 
leads to the maintenance/survival of authoritarian regimes. 
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Nevertheless, policy specialists and researchers have been misinterpreting the 
Arab world after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (Heydemann 2007). 
Democracy promotion has led to the resilience of authoritarian regimes in the Arab 
world (Heydemann 2007). Previously, academics have argued in favor of democracy 
promotion whereby “the simplest and most fundamental motive for the promotion of 
democracy is to extend to foreigners the benefit of a system that is valued at home” 
(O’Donnell, Schmitter, & Whitehead 1986: 10). On the other hand, the international 
variable - democracy promotion - can also be a variable contributing to the Arab 
world’s resilience (Heydemann 2007). While expressing evident and potent 
repressions, authoritarian regimes have upgraded their strategies of domination to 
adjust to external and domestic pressure.  
Despite the abundant democratization deficit theories about the Middle East 
and the comparative analysis about authoritarian regimes, academics have missed 
predicting the Arab Spring because they were overwhelmed with pre-determining the 
factors inhibiting transition away from authoritarian regimes. Predominant 
explanations focused on existing internal variables whereby “in much of the Middle 
East democratization may be harder to imagine, in part because of the apparent 
strength of oil-financed monarchies (such as the Saudi regime), but also because of 
the conflict with Israel, and most basically because of an asserted incompatibility 
between Islam and Western Liberalism” (Whitehead 2002: 190). 
There are no specific instructions to follow in order to achieve democracy that 
is applicable at all times and to all cases. The role played by external variables has 
multiple outcomes and paths. Analyzing the international factor of democratization 
may come in three major forms: contagion, control, and consent (Whitehead 1996). 
Arguing that each form focuses on specific variables- contagion focuses solely on 
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geographic location of country studied, control focuses on motivation of actors, and 
consent focuses on interaction between international and internal politics- Whitehead 
contends that at most times, there is significant overlay between the three forms 
(Whitehead 1996). A fundamental and recent form of international influence should 
be added as a fourth category to Whitehead’s three categories (Schmitter in 
Whitehead 1996). Conditionality is the most recent dimension of international 
influence, which has the use of coercion as its fundamental hallmark. 
Nevertheless, some scholars, such as Schmitter, underscore the importance of 
internal dynamics on the process of democratic transition. He contended that “regime 
change tends to be a domestic affair; democratization is a domestic affair par 
excellence” (Schmitter in Whitehead 1996: 27). As a conclusion of the different 
conceptualizations of the dynamics and influences of the international dimension:  
Grosso modo, there seem to be four ways of conceptualizing the dynamics of 
interaction between the international sub-contexts of power and influence and 
the varied national cases of democratization. One can adopt a basically 
functionalist view and interpret the outcome in terms of an adaptation of the 
latter to independent and exorable trends in the former. Alternatively, the 
emphasis could be more historically contingent and focus on the impact of 
discrete events (or even personalities). Or one can place primary emphasis on 
the complex, temporally structured interaction between cases and assign 
primary importance to waves of diffusion and imitation. Or one can take a 
genetic perspective and emphasize the changing nature and importance of the 
international context upon different stages of the democratization process. 
None of these four is mutually exclusive; all may eventually contribute to 
improving our understanding; each will, however, bring up different variables 
and generate different hypotheses, and may even lead one to different 
conclusions (Schmitter in Whitehead 1996: 31). 
 
Regardless of the importance of internal variables on democratic transition 
initiation, course, and outcome, the role of external variables is indispensable in 
systematically and comparatively contributing to the democratization debate. External 
dynamics can tip the initiated process, path, and most importantly the outcome of 
democratic transitions.  
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On the other hand, moving away from contagion, control, consent, 
conditionality, democracy promotion, and regional contexts, there has not been much 
literature emphasizing on the role of external factors in determining the impact of the 
democratization transition in authoritarian regimes. Moreover, Charles Powell 
emphasized the vast literature found on Spain’s democratization transition but with no 
attention oriented towards the international context of the transition process 
(Whitehead 1996). Much of the theories and explanations revolve around the 
condensed importance of external factors in consolidating democracy. An example of 
this can be Schmitter’s argument that the link between the international dimension 
and domestic outcomes is fundamental in the consolidation of democracy because 
“regardless of the form (control, contagion, consent, or conditionality) that it takes, 
external intervention will have greater and more lasting effect upon the consolidation 
of democracy than upon the transition to it” (Schmitter in Whitehead 1996: 40).  On 
the contrary, the external factor has a crucial and fundamental impact on the process 
of transition because the variation in its impact can lead to regime breakdown or 
regime maintenance.  
 
2.5- Conclusion 
Therefore, studying the variation in the impact of external variables cannot but 
be depicted through the operationalization of a number of variables such as the factor 
of oil, geopolitical location, alliances, and foreign policy. This chapter assessed the 
dimensions of three democratic transition paradigms, which has focused on the 
impact of internal variables and then introduced a fourth transition paradigm; the role 
of external dynamics. Nevertheless, this chapter emphasized that after the Arab 
Spring, the different set of internal variables used by scholars and practitioners as the 
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reason behind the democratic resilience of Middle Eastern regimes are falsifiable. 
Taking two distinct case studies, Bahrain and Libya, and unpacking the role of 
external dynamics in democratic transitions will contribute to the earlier works on 
transit-ology theories of O’Donnell, Schmitter, Whitehead, Diamond, Linz, Lipset, 
and Lindberg. Why has the international intervention in Libya led to regime 
breakdown whereas the regional intervention in Bahrain led to regime maintenance?  
The next chapter will examine the case of Libya in order to identify the wide-
ranged external response to the Libyan uprising, which will lead us to identify the 
causality behind the military intervention that led to regime breakdown.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
FROM QADDAFI’S IDIOSYNCRATIC 
CALCULATIONS TO NATO’S AIR-MISSILES 
“Events, past and present … are the true, the only reliable 
teachers of political scientists”- Hannah Arendt 
 
3.1 Introduction 
On 23 October 2011, the Chairman of the National Transitional Council of 
Libya, Mustafa Abdul Jalil, announced from Benghazi Libya’s Liberation. The 
announcement was depicted as the end of four decades of struggle for the Libyans. 
Calling out for stability and the end of the struggle, Abdul Jalil announced the Islamic 
Sharia as the principle source of legislation.  This unanticipated move by the NTC 
was seen as a double-edged sword. Focusing on Islamic Sharia as the basic source of 
legislation and at the same time emphasizing the importance of moderate Islamic rule, 
the NTC’s motive was to balance between the demands of the Libyans and the fears 
of the West. 
This chapter analyzes authoritarian regime breakdown in Libya. Exploring the 
importance of external dynamics of democratization as a transition paradigm, it 
examines the major variables such as oil, geopolitical location, alliances, and foreign 
policy in order to understand why an international response in the form of direct 
military intervention occurred in Libya but not in other Arab Spring states. Therefore, 
two case studies, Libya and Bahrain - which will be examined in chapter four - will be 
analyzed with the aim not to reveal universal truths but rather to understand the 
different ways that the international level affected authoritarian regime breakdown. 
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3.2 Libya’s Frail Independence 
A federal state with a constitutional monarchy headed by King Idriss Al 
Senussi, the 1951 constitution was the fruit of Libyan independence. Adopting 
patronage policy to ensure compliance and gain of monetary benefits, Al Senussi’s 
rule was characterized as an extended form of colonialism.  With Arab nationalism 
depicted as the major challenge for Al Senussi, “Libya’s journey to independence was 
shaped more by international than by internal forces, and the local people were little 
more than bystanders in the deliberations over their fate” (Pargeter 2012: 29).  
In 1953-1954, Great Britain and the United States of America were granted 
extended forms of imperial rights through twenty-year treaties of friendship under 
which both military facilities and overflying rights were permitted in exchange for 
economic and monetary aid. Libya’s geostrategic location in North Africa was crucial 
to both powers. For example, “when President Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal in 
1956, Britain seriously considered using its Libyan bases to launch attacks against 
Egypt” (Pargeter 2012: 44). Nevertheless, Idris opposed all demonstrations that 
occurred against his regime in the early 1950s and 1960s, but “the monarchy [was] 
generally viewed as having a fairly benign institution” (Pargeter 2012: 48). 
Moreover, the role of the British forces in Libya had an indirect effect on 
Qaddafi’s 1st of September 1969 coup. As a young ideologue, Qaddafi had big plans 
for his country and he knew that joining the Army would be the salvation for his 
planned revolution. Training Libyan troops to defend their country, the 1957 British 
Military Academy proved to be pivotal because it was the academy in which the 
1964-army recruit, Qaddafi, was trained. With a belated participation in the Six Day 
War of 1967, and having President Abed El Nasser as an idol, Qaddafi was 
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determined to avenge the Arab cause, to wipe clean the Egyptian humiliation, and to 
attack the allies of Israel. Determined to revolt since school days, Qaddafi convinced 
his revolution companions Abdelsalam Jalloud, Omar Al-Meheishi, Mustafa 
Kharroubi, Abu Bakr Younes Jaber, Khweildi Al Humaidi, and others to join the 
army in order to form what was later known as the First Unionist Officers Movement 
and the Revolutionary Command Council (Pargeter 2012). 
Many argued that it is impossible to imagine Libya without Qaddafi; 
therefore, it is “impossible to separate four decades of Libyan politics from the rule of 
Muammar Qaddafi, who first seized power in a military coup in 1969” (Brynen, 
Moore, Salloukh, & Zahar 2012: 27).  Forcibly living their lives based on the mantra 
of the Libyan dictator, Libyans were prisoners of Qaddafi’s 1974 Green Book, which 
was a collection of shattered and obscure thoughts and analyses. The Revolutionary 
Committees Movement, imprinted the nature of post-1969 coup d’état, were tied to 
the Revolutionary Committees Liaison Office- solely composed of Qaddafi’s family 
members and tribe (Pargeter 2012). 
Taking a comparative look at Al Senussi’s monarchical rule and Qaddafi’s 
Jamahiriya, one of the most pivots of differences between the two was the type and 
style of foreign relations conducted with the West. The Socialist People's Libyan 
Arab Jamahiriya, best known as the State of the Masses, had strained foreign relations 
with the West throughout of Qaddafi’s long rule. On the other hand, King Idris made 
his best efforts to remain on good terms with his Western allies despite the will of his 
people. Both Qaddafi and Al Senussi neglected the will of the Libyans. Disregarding 
the type of regimes’ reinforcement mechanism, whether it is through adaptation or 
through intimidation, “there is no way to govern, administer, dictate, arbitrate, 
adjudicate, guide, interrogate, or represent a political community, except through 
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influencing the understanding of the individuals who compose it” (Whitehead 2002: 
48). 
There was a varied international response to the Libyan crisis in 1969 and that 
of 2011. When the coup d’état against the frail king, Al Senussi, was implemented, 
the call-outs for British help were to no avail because Britain was “engaged in the 
policy of Harold Wilson’s government of progressive withdrawal from its former 
colonies” (Pargeter 2012: 59). Contrary to the 1st of September coup d’état, the 
international response to the February 15
th
, 2011 revolution differed with NATO’s 
direct military intervention because “NATO intervention certainly prevented the 
regime from overrunning Benghazi in March, but was unable to deliver a quick 
military victory for the opposition” (Brynen, Moore, Salloukh, & Zahar 2012: 29). 
 
3.3- Libya Is Not Qaddafi 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Libya’s Geographic Map1 
                                                        
1
 Map retrieved from CIA World Fact book-Libya 
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Qaddafi described the reason behind the First Unionist Officers Movement in the 
following manner: 
Our souls were in revolt against the backwardness enveloping our country and 
its land, whose best gifts and riches were being lost through plunder, and 
against the isolation imposed on our people in vain attempt to hold it back 
from the path of the Arab people and from its greatest cause (First 1974: 102). 
 
The anti-imperialist Qaddafi made sure to purify Libyan soil by closing all British and 
American military bases and nationalizing its oil. Therefore, “Libyan politics and 
administration were dependent on the whims of the country’s peculiar dictator and his 
apparent aversion to strong and permanent institutions” (Brynen, Moore, Salloukh, & 
Zahar 2012: 27). Having his tribe and family members as key beneficiaries of the 
country’s oil wealth, “Libya’s oil wealth - accounting for around 95 percent of export 
earnings and 25 percent of GDP, and providing for 60 percent of government wages -
undoubtedly played a role in sustaining the Qaddafi dictatorship” (Brynen, Moore, 
Salloukh, & Zahar 2012: 28). For such reasons, the corrupt regime of Qaddafi had 
long instigated the rage of youth due to high levels of unemployment. Whilst taking 
into consideration the socioeconomic and political forces in Libya, “this revolution [in 
2011] did not occur in vacuum. It was inspired and spurred on by the momentous 
events that were shaking the entire region” (Pargeter 2012: 1).  
A self-promoted Colonel and Commander of the Armed Forces, Qaddafi’s 
multifaceted security battalions were effectively trained to forcibly crush any 
opposition; however, after the Arab Spring’s Tunisian ‘Jasmine Revolution’ and the 
Egyptian ‘January 25th Revolution’, Libya was geographically surrounded by 
youthful vibes in demand for change (refer to Figure 3.1). Pollack argues that “with 
the strong dictatorships in Tunisia and Egypt overthrown, it was perhaps inevitable 
that the dysfunctional dictatorship lying between them- Libya- would face a similar 
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challenge” (Pollack et al. 2011: 4). Despite the fact that more than three attempted 
revolutions occurred against Qaddafi in 1969, 1976, 1984, and early 1990s, “the 
Libyan uprising that erupted in February 2011 was fundamentally rooted in socio-
economic and political dissatisfaction, but was also clearly inspired by events in 
Tunisia and Egypt” (Brynen, Moore, Salloukh, & Zahar 2012: 28). 
 
3.4- A New Dawn 
On 1 September 1969, Qaddafi addressed his people: 
 
People of Libya! In response to your own free will, fulfilling your most 
heartfelt wishes, answering your incessant demands for change and 
regeneration and your longing to strive towards these ends, listening to your 
incitement to rebel, your armed forces have taken the overthrow of the 
reactionary and corrupt regime, the stench of which has sickened and horrified 
us all… From this day forward Libya is free, self-governing republic… She 
will advance on the road to freedom, the path of unity and social justice, 
guaranteeing equality to all her citizens and throwing wide in front of them the 
gates of honest employment where injustice and exploitation will be banished, 
where no one will count himself master or servant, and where he will be free, 
brothers within a society in which, with God’s help, prosperity and equality 
will be seen to rule us all (Mirella Bianco 1974: 65). 
 
Ironically, the people of Libya might have recalled the Brother Leader’s words of 
revolution on the 15th of February 2011 when Fathi Terbil was arrested due to his 17 
February plans for the ‘Day of Rage’ as a call-out for reform (Pargeter 2012). 
However, this time it was the people of Libya who brutally overthrew the 
idiosyncratic and corrupt regime of Qaddafi, and “the cruelest irony of all in this […] 
was that after years of the Colonel calling on the masses to rise up in the service of his 
revolution, […] they did so in order to destroy him and all that he had created” 
(Pargeter 2012: 247). On 15
 
February, the young Libyan Ahmed Lebderi followed the 
footsteps of the Tunisian Mohamed Buazizi, who had sparked the Jasmine Revolution 
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of Tunisia and ignited the Arab Spring (Pargeter 2012). It is not a coincidence that 17 
February was chosen as a day to call out for reforms. That day marked the fourth 
anniversary of the 17 February 2006 riots in Tripoli against the cartoonish depiction 
of the Prophet Mohammad which later turned as a demonstration against the regime; 
an incident that marked the death of more than ten Libyan protestors (Pargeter 2012). 
Moreover, it is also not a coincidence that one of the most enduring symbols for the 
2011 protestors was the Libyan flag of the post-independence – but pre-Qaddafi - 
period, which symbolizes Libya’s freedom and independence. 
Days after the start of the uprising, Qaddafi’s regime realized that the 2011 
revolts were not like the 2006 riots. With the opposition acquiring weapons, the 
fighting between anti-government rebels and Qaddafi’s forces centered around 
Benghazi and Misurata (Vira and Cordesman 2011). Although anti-government forces 
controlled Benghazi, Bayda, Dema, Tobruk, and Misurata, heavy fighting around 
these cities tipped the balance in favor of regime forces (Vira and Cordesman 2011). 
Consequently, and within a month of the Libyan uprising, the international 
community decided to intervene on the side of the opposition. 
Only two days after the United Nations Security Council accepted France’s 
and the United Kingdom’s proposal to end immediately the civil strife in Libya 
through direct military intervention, the modest impetus of the aerial and naval strikes 
of the NATO forces on March 19, 2011 tipped the balance of power in the Libyan 
civil conflict. Formed of former colonial powers of Africa, NATO’s intervention in 
Libya, Operation Unified Protector, remained for around nine months (refer to Figure 
3.2).  Whitehead argues that when the democratic transition “is related to processes of 
national liberation and assertiveness, the intromission of foreigners can be especially 
unwelcome-even if, […] weak domestic political forces may be sorely tempted to 
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look for outside help” (Whithead 1996: 41). In the case of Libya’s NTC, “the 
opposition leaders were initially against external military intervention because they 
felt it would diminish their credibility, but when Qaddafi appeared close to retaking 
Benghazi and likely reestablishing control, the NTC began pleading for help” (Al 
Turk in Pollack et al. 2011: 121). 
 
 
Figure 3.2- Comparison between NATO and Pro-Qaddafi Forces
2
 
 
Facing a merciless fate, Qaddafi was shot dead on 20 October 2011 by the 
rebellious Libyan people. With Qaddafi’s life brought to an end, Libya began the 
journey of embarking on a new dawn; in other words, “the sun had finally set on the 
era of Qaddafism” (Pargeter 2012: 247). 
                                                        
2Retrieved from Task Force, (2012) “Can NATO react to the Arab Spring?” The Henry M. Jackson 
School of International Studies, pp. 1-301 
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The four decades of the Brother Leader’s rule of Libya ended brutally because 
“with his unstinting Bedouin pride and uncompromising self-belief, there was no way 
the colonel was going to step aside and walk away from power gracefully - let alone 
flee the country” (Pargeter 2012: 226). Excluding himself from any normal political 
position or title in Libya since 1977, Qaddafi’s influence on the Libyan political 
community was not quite explicit and “indeed a government that neglected to arouse 
and persuade its subjects or its public would in due course lose their attention and 
therefore their compliance” (Whitehead 2002: 49). 
Furthermore, throughout the four decades of his rule, Qaddafi made sure to 
create an image of invincibility for himself by expressing that “in the interests of 
conformity, all political activity outside the official framework of the state was 
banned- something that culminated in the controversial Law No. 71 of 1972, which 
made engaging in party politics a crime punishable by death, and which remained in 
place until the fall of the regime” (Pargeter 2012: 72). On the other hand, today, a 
Libya without Qaddafi is actually a new dawn because “the idiosyncratic and 
dictatorial nature of the Qaddafi regime and the weaknesses of long-repressed Libyan 
civil society also meant that the rebels inherited few organizational resources upon 
which to build alternative state structures” (Brynen, Moore, Salloukh, & Zahar 2012: 
29). 
 
3.5- From the Policy of Subversion to Confrontation 
The United States invasion of Grenada in 1983 was a case of democratization 
imposed by conquest. Since 1945, the United States started adopting “indirect means 
of leverage over internal political affairs of the independent states of Latin America, 
the Caribbean, and the Mediterranean” (Whitehead in O’Donnell, Schmitter, and 
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Whitehead 1986: 4). Nevertheless, as in the case of Grenada, the United States used 
direct means of leverage over internal political affairs in Libya whether through 
imposing economic and political sanctions or through engaging in military operations. 
Nevertheless, in the 2011 Libyan uprising, the United States’ role was to ‘lead from 
behind’. 
One of the most personalized and autocratic regimes in the Middle East, 
Qaddafi’s Libya was and is a priority to Washington because “policy makers in 
Washington saw Libya, together with the remainder of North Africa and the Middle 
East, as falling within a highly sensitive security zone” (St. John 2002: 3). Influenced 
by the forces of the past, Libya under Qaddafi entered a lacuna of misconducted, 
misunderstood, and strained relations with the West, in particular with the United 
States because “the new income [oil revenues] freed the monarchy from its former 
dependence on foreign base revenues and thus made possible new policies that were 
inconceivable less than a decade earlier” (St. John 2002: 16). 
In the case of Libya, despite that 1977 marked its addition to the list of 
adversaries to the Pentagon, it was only when direct attacks on US Embassy in Tripoli 
in 1979 occurred that Libya’s diplomatic relations between US and UK were cut-off. 
Nevertheless, the imposition of sanctions in early 1990s through the United Nations 
Security Council Resolutions 731, 748, and 883 characterized the United States, 
United Kingdom, and the three veto powers’ confrontational policy towards Libya. 
“Prior to the decade of the 1980s, concepts and terms related to rogue or pariah states, 
backlash or maverick regime, or nuclear outlaws were not in common uses in 
academic or policy making circles” (St. John 2002: 155). The tension between the 
United States and Libya was reached when “on 7 January 1986, President Reagan 
issued Executive orders 12543 and 12544. These orders declared a national state of 
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emergency with Libya and imposed broad economic sanctions against Tripoli, 
including the freezing of Libyan assets in US territories”  (Otman & Karlberg 2007: 
43).  
Neither the 1986 “swift and effective retribution against the forces of 
international terrorism” (Laham 2007: 3) nor the United Nations Resolutions over the 
1988 case of Lockerbie’s Pan Am Flight 103 impeded Qaddafi’s adversarial and 
subversive foreign and national policies. Yet, Libyans were optimistic regarding 
enhancing relations with the US with every new administration. Ranging between 
confrontational and covert policies, the United States could not but view Qaddafi “as 
an unpredictable irritant who would be best out of the way” (Pargeter 2012: 238).  
With the end of President Ronald Reagan’s eight-year presidency, President 
George H. W. Bush supported a “covert policy to provide military aid and training to 
several hundred former Libyan soldiers. Set in motion during the final months of the 
Reagan administration, this covert operation hoped to use Libyan volunteers captured 
during the 1988 border fighting between Libya and Chad to destabilize the Qaddafi 
government” (St. John 2002: 154). On the other hand, with five US successive 
presidential administrations, the Libyan foreign policy of subversion was not 
changed. It was not until “ 5 April 1999, 13 years of US sanctions and seven years of 
UN sanctions, the Libyan government turned over to British authorities two suspects 
in the terrorist bombing of Pan Am Flight 103” (Otman & Karlberg 2007: 42). 
Nevertheless, it was only in December 2003 that the Libyan government announced 
the abandoning of weapons of mass destruction programs (Pargeter 2012). What were 
the reasons for the minor reversal in Qaddafi’s policies? After Libya’s exclusion from 
the international community for more than eighteen years, Qaddafi was facing the 
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threat of Islamism, a rise in socioeconomic challenges, and the U.S. post 9/11 War on 
Terror strategy. 
With declared Western support for the 2011 National Transitional Council, 
NATO’s air missiles were supporting mechanisms for the stated objective because 
“had NATO not entered the conflict when it did, it is likely that the rebel forces would 
not have been able to dislodge Qaddafi from the west of the country and would not 
have prevented him from re-taking the east” (Pargeter 2012: 8). The light and small 
weapons that spread amongst the Libyan rebels were insufficient to confront the loyal 
battalions of Qaddafi because “by filling his security battalions with those of his own 
kith and kin, Qaddafi ensured that their fate was so closely entwined with his own that 
they were in no position to try to oust him” (Pargeter 2012: 225). France, Italy, 
Canada, and Germany rushed to recognize the NTC as the legitimate representative of 
the Libyan people. However, the United States’ decision to recognize the NTC was 
the gate that allowed the flow of monetary support from all Libyan assets that were 
frozen in US for years. 
From accusations of being a supporter of international terrorism, to the 
subversion policy adopted in Africa, Middle East, and Western Europe, Qaddafi was 
depicted by the West as a detestable cartoonish character who ruled a state according 
to his own whimsical thoughts and analyses -which are best known as the Third 
Universal theory (Laham 2007). From accusations of acquiring weapons of mass 
destruction to being a supporter of international terrorism, the anti-imperialist Qaddafi 
knew that the external powers’ calculations were to take advantage of the eruption of 
social discontent on February 15
th
. The only question Qaddafi miscalculated was the 
extent the foreign powers were ready to interfere in internal Libyan strife. Qaddafi 
was taken by surprise when almost a month after the social upheaval stayed; the 
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international community authorized NATO to undertake direct military attacks 
because he knew that the Libyan military apparatus was not equipped to face the 
forces of NATO.  
The legal authorization of NATO’s intervention in Libya was through the 
United Nations Security Council, which voted 10 in favor to none against for the need 
and responsibility to protect the Libyan civilians. Nevertheless, the use of 
Responsibility to Protect – initiated by the United Nations in 2005 - at most times 
sparks controversy.  Neither limited in scope, time, or duration, NATO’s 
humanitarian intervention under Chapter VII of the United Nations was understood 
not an infringement of Libya’s sovereignty. In a report for the United Nations 
Secretary General in 2009, Ban Ki Moon, identified the three pillars of R2P as 
follow
3
: 
1. The protection responsibilities of the state 
2. International assistance and capacity building 
3. Timely and decisive response 
 With no specific sequence for implementation of these pillars, the international 
community has a duty to respond in cases of genocide, crimes against humanity, war 
crimes, and ethnic cleansing when a state fails to protect its civilians. Nevertheless, 
when it comes to implementing the 3
rd
 pillar, military intervention remains a 
controversial aspect of R2P. The role of NATO forces was explicitly for the 
protection of the Libyans and for the avoidance of public massacres. However, the 
role of the NATO forces was not to instigate regime change.  The international 
community was reluctant at the outbreak of the uprising to declare a unified stance; 
however, when rebels’ control of several cities including Benghazi was at stake, 
                                                        
3
 Implementing the responsibility to protect: report of the Secretary General. UN General Assembly, 12 
January 2009 A/63/677, retrieved from www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4989924d2.html 
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NATO’s intervention led by United States from behind took the role of protecting 
Libyans and ousting Qaddafi. Moreover, Qaddafi had left himself with few if no foes 
to defend him, so when the Arab League called for the support of the Libyan 
protestors, NATO forces knew that it were the right time to free the Libyans from the 
grip of Qaddafi. 
 
3.6- Intervention Against the Colonel  
What explains authoritarian regime breakdown in a case like Libya? 
Acknowledging that both the institutional framework and historical legacy are 
important, they nevertheless do not overshadow the role of external dynamics during 
the Arab Spring.  When analyzing domestic variables, the loss of the necessities and 
requirements that led to the regime’s establishment will lead to cracks in the regime 
(Przeworski in O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead 1986). Nevertheless, a tipping 
point affecting regime’s maintenance is foreign intervention, which can occur directly 
or indirectly. In the case of Libya, the regime lost its legitimacy, a few members of 
Qaddafi’s inner circle defected, and foreign pressure was exerted in terms of military 
assistance to the opposition.  
In theoretical and comparative analyses of democratization, there are basically 
two major yet general paths for the breakdown of authoritarian regimes and transition 
towards democratization. The first path of regime breakdown is initiated from within 
the ruling coalition, while the second path “can be drawn from the civilianized 
political leadership, the military-as-government, or the military-as-institution which 
acts against the military-as-government or the civilianized political leadership” 
(Stepan in O’Donnell, Schmitter, & Whitehead 1986: 65). Nevertheless, a society-led 
regime breakdown is pivotal in setting the frame for democratic transitions (Stepan in 
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O’Donnell, Schmitter, & Whitehead 1986). In the case of Libya, a society led regime 
breakdown with foreign pressure and military assistance led to the demise of 
Qaddafi’s authoritarian regime. 
Consequently, following the breakdown of any authoritarian regime, 
aspirations for democratic transitions prevail. Nevertheless, the path for democratic 
process and its stability depends on various contexts because “before a democratic 
transition can begin there must be a political community receptive to democratic 
aspirations. After the regime change has taken place, the same community must 
respond to the new possibilities for political participation” (Whitehead 2002: 65). 
Nevertheless, as much as it is important to pin down both the role of Libya’s strategic 
geographic location in North Africa as a gate to the Arab, African, and Mediterranean 
worlds and the factor of oil wealth that allowed Qaddafi to free Libya from the 
economic and monetary aid of foreign powers, “the international context is a 
notoriously difficult variable to pin down” (Schmitter in Whitehead 1996: 28). As 
Schmitter notes, the role of external variables was very important in transitions in 
Eastern Europe, he asks: “Would the astonishingly rapid changes in Poland, Hungary, 
East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria in 1989-90 have even been 
imaginable, much less gone as far as they did, without a prior change in the 
hegemonic pretensions of the Soviet Union?” (Schmitter in Whitehead 1996: 27). 
 
3.7- An Unfolded Chapter 
When the waves of the Arab Spring spread gradually across the Middle East, 
many policy specialists attempted to analyze the time and context that led to the 
massive social discontent. The revolts that occurred in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya were 
remarkable in the way the barriers of fear were shattered. People all around the world 
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witnessed how the authoritarian regimes’ coercive apparatus did not survive people’s 
power. Nevertheless, the more authoritarian regimes used force, the larger the number 
of protestors became, and the more defiant people were. In the case of Libya, 
Qaddafi, “the prophet of the desert, was not [as] invincible as he thought” (Pargeter 
2012: 163).  The reason the support of foreign powers was successful in breaking 
Qaddafi’s regime is because “domestic prodemocracy groups [were] powerful enough 
to constitute a credible alternative to the status-quo” (Sayyid in Schlumberger 2007: 
216). 
As a matter of fact, Qaddafi did not focus much on internal development as 
much as he focused on avenging the international community in particular the United 
States. Qaddafi who had “skillfully blended the threads of nationalism, anti-
imperialism, and pan-Islamic loyalties, which had emerged in Libya at the beginning 
of the twentieth century, with contemporary movements for Arab nationalism, Arab 
socialism, and Arab unity” (St. John 2002: 4) could not free himself from the 
influences of the forces of the Libyan past. Qaddafi’s motive was to challenge 
American interests in Middle East, in Western Europe, and in all around the world 
(Laham 2007).  With the end of the Cold War, the international community headed by 
the United States was determined to remove Qaddafi’s regime. Libya, for all what it 
stands for in terms of its strategic geopolitical and natural resources, was ruled by an 
irritant and unpredictable dictator. However, even the period of Libyan-West détente 
in 2003 as a consequence of Libya’s abandonment of weapons of mass destruction did 
not lead for better relations between the West and Qaddafi.  Nevertheless, with the 
2001 war on Afghanistan and the 2003 confrontation with Iraq, the several subliminal 
attempts to remove Qaddafi were to no avail until the Jamahiriya decided to revolt 
defiantly against its oppressor. 
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Despite the fact that Libyan oil wealth reduced the country’s dependency on 
foreign aid and economic assistance, “but [it] increased the complexity of […Libya’s] 
socioeconomic and political problems” (St. John 2002: 3). Now that Qaddafi’s era has 
ended, witnessing a democratic transition in Libya after witnessing a regime change 
remains a possible scenario since “just as the audience needs the performance in order 
to absorb the drama, so also the citizens need a visible transition in order to 
internalize changed rules of political action” (Whitehead 2002: 45). 
Looking at Libya after a year from the revolution, many have argued that 
“Libya was fast beginning to look like a collective of city states, and the periphery 
was taking its revenge on the center” (St. John 2002: 248). With national elections 
held in July 2012, the Centrist party led by the defected former economic advisor of 
Qaddafi, Mahmoud Jibril, heads the largest seats in the General National Congress of 
Libya. With no new constitution formulated and tribes maintaining security in a form 
of complete lawlessness, question marks are raised about the possibility of Libya’s 
unity and cohesion after two years from the revolution. Nevertheless, it is worth 
mentioning that “[ousting] an authoritarian regime can swiftly degenerate into civil 
war if contending factions within society cannot agree on a new set of rules of the 
game” (Grand in Pollack et al. 2011: 25). 
Moreover, examining the role of external dynamics of democratization and 
taking a glimpse at Whitehead’s three categories for the role of international factors - 
contagion, control, and consent - can be adopted in the case of Libya as a sequence 
for the processes that occurred. For the demise of Qaddafi, Libya’s geostrategic 
location, natural resources, and the calculations of the dominant powers were 
important in linking international variables to national politics. 
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3.8- Conclusion 
In the mid-1970s, no one believed that countries such as East Timor, South 
Africa, Cambodia, and Albania would experience democratization. Whitehead notes 
that, “over the past twenty years, the reality of democratization has been diffused 
across the globe penetrating into the most remote and improbable of locations” 
(Whitehead 2002: 1). The Middle East, with its geographic range from Tehran to 
Rabat, experienced for the first time a phenomena of extended political, economic, 
and security crisis that began spreading across Arab countries gradually at the end of 
2010. However, many authoritarian regimes in the Middle East continue to survive 
despite the Arab upheavals. The pattern of using coercive action against protestors 
was seen in almost all the states that witnessed social uprising such as Tunisia, Egypt, 
Bahrain, Libya, and Syria.  Therefore, violence against protestors was used as a form 
of instigating fear among civilians to preserve the regime because “the only lesson 
authoritarian bureaucrats draw from past failures is that some additional repression is 
needed until things get straightened out” (Przeworski in O’Donnell, Schmitter, & 
Whitehead 1986: 59). The importance of the Arab discontent phenomena lies not only 
in analyzing the causes and reasons for the Arab Spring but rather in searching for 
exits so that stability and prosperity can flourish in the countries that witnessed 
uprisings.  
This chapter highlighted the strategic importance of Libya as a strategic 
gateway in North Africa whilst depicting the complex forty-two year rule of Qaddafi. 
Emphasizing the terms and the circumstances that led to NATO’s modest impetus, 
which led to a regime change in Libya, this chapter concluded that there are multi-
causal variables at stake in the case of Libya. From Libya’s geostrategic location, to 
its natural resources, and Qaddafi’s idiosyncratic calculations, NATO’s intervention 
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was enigmatically the key for regime breakdown.  The next chapter tackles the case of 
Bahrain. It assesses how the regional intervention led by the Gulf Cooperation 
Council against the protestors led to regime stability and maintenance.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
FROM A SHORT LIVED UPRISING TO AN 
UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 
 
“The masses never revolt of their own accord, and they never revolt 
merely because they are oppressed. Indeed, so long as they are not 
permitted to have standards of comparison, they never even become 
aware that they are oppressed”- George Orwell 
 
4.1- Introduction 
The aftermath of even the most popular revolutions has not always been rosy. 
The French experienced the Great Terror after the Liberty, Equality, Fraternity 
revolution of 1792, the Russians became prisoners of Joseph Stalin’s Great Purge 
after the 1917 Bolshevik revolution, and the Iranians were led by an autocratic rule 
after their 1979 revolt (Bradley 2012). Inspired by the Tunisian and Egyptian 
uprising, the Bahrainis took to the streets of Manama demanding reforms. With the 
eyes of the world focused on events in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, the social uprising 
in Manama had minimal media coverage.  Within less than a month, autocratic 
regimes like that of Ben Ali and Mubarak were toppled. Arabs across the Middle East 
saw that regimes that were once depicted as impregnable were in fact paralyzed. 
Although social uprisings did not fly across all of North Africa, “the successful 
example of one country’s transition establishes it as a model to imitate and, once a 
given region is sufficiently saturated with this mode of political dominance, pressure 
will mount to compel the remaining autocracies to conform to the newly established 
norm” (Whitehead 1996, p. 38). From North Africa, the wave of Arab discontent 
reached the shores of the Persian Gulf. Pollack argues, “in Bahrain, for instance, the 
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protests immediately engaged the country’s deep Sunni-Shi’i divide, to the point 
where it became unclear how much the new opposition was merely the old Shii 
opposition in a new garb and how much a different, more ecumenical protest 
movement (one driven more by class grievances) that embraced a wider spectrum of 
the Bahraini populace” was emerging (Pollack et al. 2011: 4). 
This chapter analyzes the uprising that occurred in the Kingdom of Bahrain 
starting on 14 February 2011. It explores the role of external dynamics, international 
and regional, in authoritarian regime maintenance. Whilst introducing the global 
importance of the Arabian Peninsula, this chapter examines the international and 
regional reactions towards the Bahraini discontent. After explaining the reason for the 
lingered tension between Gulf Cooperation Council and Iran, the chapter offers 
explanations for the maintenance of al-Khalifa regime. 
 
4.2- The Precious Gulf  
“You cannot destroy the Polish national-consciousness or Poles 
on the battlefield, but if you give them power, they will destroy 
themselves” 
 -Otto Eduard Leopold, Prince of Bismarck 
Founder and 1
st
 Chancellor of German Empire 
 
For the past two decades, vast literature has examined the unfound pre-
requisites in the Middle East whilst offering remedies for the existing problems. 
Policy makers and specialists have argued that “the specific type of non-democratic 
rule still dominating in the Arab world is neo-patrimonialism in which political power 
rests primarily on co-option” (Albrecht and Schlumberger 2004: 372). However, 
Brynen, Moore, Salloukh, & Zahar argue that “neo-patrimonial strategies of co-
optation and the coercive agencies physical and symbolic power failed to prevent the 
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emergence of the kind of collective action that overwhelmed the state’ ability to 
control it” (2012: 290). Moreover, the accumulation of grievances kindled the spark 
for “the events that began in Tunisia in January 2011 and spread to Egypt and then 
Libya, Jordan, Morocco, Bahrain, Syria, and beyond, [which] shook the political, 
social, and intellectual foundations of the Middle East” (Pollack et al. 2011: 1). The 
reason behind the collapse of the walls of fear across the region is because “suddenly, 
Arabs everywhere saw people just like themselves, angry about problems just like 
their own, defying vast autocracies just like those they lived under, and toppling 
regimes that had once seemed impregnable” (Pollack et al. 2011: 3). After all, the 
theories of democratic pre-requisites and the lack of democratic foundations in the 
Middle East have been proven falsifiable after the Arab Spring because “Arabs are 
not, of course, somehow genetically or culturally incapable of embracing 
representative democracy” (Bradley 2012: 15). 
Considered a newly independent state, only forty-two years ago, Bahrain 
declared its independence after ending its British protectorate status. After liberating 
the island from Persian rule in 1783, it is worth mentioning that “for the al-Khalifa 
family that has ruled Bahrain for over 200 years, the notion of sharing power with the 
Shi’i population raises existential fears that will have to be addressed” (Doran and 
Shaikh in Pollack et al. 2011: 194). With several disrupted uprisings against al- 
Khalifa’s regime in 1981 and 1994-2000, the Iranians were constantly blamed for 
inflaming discontents in the Kingdom. Accusing Iran for all the problems that face the 
Bahrainis goes back to 1957, when Bahrain was claimed by Iran to be its 14
th
 
province; a dispute that was only resolved after the intervention of the United Nations 
Security Council. After the 2000 uprising, the National Action Charter was 
considered an embedment of promised reforms. The Charter introduced elections, 
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women’s right to vote, and Bahrain’s Kingdom status. But reform was only promised 
and was never attempted. For example, the Prime Minister is Sheikh Khalifa Bin 
Salman Al Khalifa, the King’s uncle, who has served in his position since 1971. 
Nevertheless, the short-lived uprising of 2011 in Manama’s Pearl Square was 
interpreted in different contexts because “in the foreshadowing of how external actors 
would respond in 2011, fears over Shiite political power accompanied Bahrain’s 
political turmoil of the period” (Brynen, Moore, Salloukh, & Zahar 2012: 81). The 
explanation behind the Bahraini political mayhem is offered “[by] the ruling al-
Khalifa family and its supporters in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), particularly 
Saudi Arabia, […as] the latest attempt by Iran to meddle in the Kingdom’s internal 
affairs where the majority of Bahrainis are Shi’i” (Doran and Shaikh in Pollack et al. 
2011: 188). Demanding political reform since 1981, demonstrations and the call up 
for change are not new phenomena in Bahrain. 
 
4.3- Challenged Interests  
Michael Doran and Salman Shaikh argue that “the crisis that flared up in 
Bahrain in February 2011 and the government’s subsequent crackdown the following 
month have presented challenges for the United States regarding its interests in the 
Gulf” (Doran and Shaikh in Pollack et al. 2011: 188). Superseding other oil rich 
countries in discovering their natural resources, Bahrain’s oil was discovered in 1932. 
Acknowledging that two issues have determined the supply and demand of the 
Middle Eastern oil, the U.S.-Soviet rivalry during Cold war and the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, “the combination of American economic, strategic, and political interests in 
the Gulf region has made it one of the highest priorities of American foreign policy, 
in both the Cold War and post-Cold war periods” (Gause 2004: 3). 
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Nevertheless, it was only after the end of the Gulf war that “a new period of 
intense and unprecedented cooperation between the United States and the GCC 
countries” (Gause 2004: 40) was ushered in. It is worth noting that since the end of 
the Vietnam War, the American military commitment in Kuwait in 1988 was the 
largest direct American intervention (Gause 2004). Viewed as the stabilizer of the 
Gulf, it is no coincidence that “the key to American policy toward the Gulf states for 
more than 50 years has been their mutual interest in the production of oil and the 
supply of oil to the world market at prices that are acceptable for both producers and 
consumers” (Gause 2004: 120).  
Knowing that the Caspian Basin and the Russian Federation cannot act as 
replacements to Gulf oil, “American oil companies were present in most of the Gulf 
states before official American diplomatic representatives were” (Gause 2004: 120). 
Walid Khadduri argues that “by 2020 it is estimated that world demand for petroleum 
will increase by 30 to 40 million barrels a day, with most of that demand increase 
coming from developing states. Two thirds of that new demand will have to be met 
from the Middle East” (Gause 2004: 64). Until such time that a viable alternative to 
oil is developed, and at affordable prices, the U.S. will remain engaged in the GCC’s 
security concerns (Luciani 2013).  
Whilst keeping a distantly friendly relationship with its non-democratic allies 
in the Gulf, the United States’ relations with Israel have complicated the oil-security 
formula that it tried to balance. Both Qatar and Bahrain were honored by the status of 
a major non-NATO ally; however, upon the events of 2011 “much like the Sunni 
monarchs, Washington seem[ed] frozen by fear of change rather than giving serious 
attention to protestors’ demands” (Brynen, Moore, Salloukh, & Zahar 2012: 89). 
Moreover, claiming fulfillment of the quest for international stability and security, 
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“[Obama] backed the Saudis in their invasion of Bahrain, backed Al Qaeda linked 
rebels in Libya, and backed the Saudi counter-revolution more generally throughout 
the region that relied on the support of the Muslim Brotherhood, its affiliates, and 
even more extremist Salafi groups from Tunisia to Egypt, Yemen to Syria” (Bradley 
2012: 203). 
Depicting the importance of Gulf oil markets in the Middle East, Bogdan 
Szajkowski argues that “the EU, for its part, is the third largest destination for Gulf 
exports, after Japan and the countries of South East Asia. Oil and refined petroleum 
by-products constitute approximately 90% of overall GCC exports to the EU” (Koch 
2005: 36). Furthermore, Koch adds: 
While GCC-EU relations are multi-faceted and multi-dimensional in 
character, the overall ineffectiveness and to some degree disappointment 
cannot be denied. Simply stated, up to this point the relationship has not 
progressed sufficiently for both sides to realize the full potential of inter-
regional cooperation or to serve as the strategic rationale for mutually 
beneficial cooperation. In particular as far as development over the past years 
is concerned, the current status of GCC-EU relations stands in contrast to the 
historical, geopolitical, and strategic considerations and interdependence that 
should lie at the heart of the relationship (Koch 2005: 8). 
 
Based on the geostrategic and oil interests of the United States and the EU in 
the Gulf, it is worth noting that the 2011 uprisings crippled the reaction of the 
international community. The reason behind the doubled international apprehension is 
fear of change versus fear of disrupting relations with the “precious” Gulf. As Table 
4.1 shows, Qatar presides atop the richest countries in the world according to GDP 
purchasing power parity per capita while the other five GCC countries are among the 
top 40 richest countries of the world. Fearing Persian influence in the Middle East, a 
set of complicated variables lie in the analysis of the importance of the relation 
between GCC and the international community, in particular, the United States. 
Nevertheless, when the social uprising in Manama occurred on February 14
th
, the 
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reason why the United States might not have taken an active role in crippling the 
Bahraini protestors was to rather allow the GCC to take appropriate action. 
 
Table 4.1- Richest Countries in the World as of 2012 
4
 
Rank Country 
GDP PPP per 
Capita 
  Rank Country 
GDP PPP 
per Capita 
1 Qatar $106,283.96    21 Denmark $37,713.42  
2 Luxembourg $79,649.49    22 Finland $36,736.33  
3 Singapore $61,046.96    23 
United 
Kingdom 
$36,605.02  
4 Norway $54,479.06    24 Japan $36,040.14  
5 Hong Kong SAR $50,716.14    25 France $35,613.45  
6 
Brunei 
Darussalam 
$50,440.03    26 South Korea $33,171.53  
7 United States $49,601.41    27 The Bahamas $31,784.15  
8 
United Arab 
Emirates 
$48,434.60    28 Israel $31,514.88  
9 Switzerland $44,015.97    29 Spain $30,315.48  
10 Kuwait $43,773.88    30 Italy $30,132.59  
11 Austria $42,589.72    31 Slovenia $28,704.93  
12 Netherlands $42,319.57    32 Cyprus $28,645.62  
13 Australia $41,467.65    33 New Zealand $28,372.27  
14 Canada $41,335.06    34 Bahrain $27,907.52  
15 Sweden $41,129.94    35 
Czech 
Republic 
$27,380.56  
16 Ireland $40,443.26    36 Oman $27,349.80  
17 
Taiwan Province 
of China 
$39,217.78    37 Malta $25,874.89  
18 Iceland $39,082.93    38 Saudi Arabia $25,465.98  
19 Germany $38,695.94    39 Seychelles $25,439.92  
20 Belgium $37,995.23    40 Greece $25,343.24  
 
 
                                                        
4
 The Richest Countries in the world according to GDP purchasing power parity per capita. Retrieved 
from Global Finance (2012), http://www.gfmag.com/tools/global-database/economic-data/ 
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4.4- The New Manifestation 
The reaction of the GCC countries to the social uprising in Tunisia, Egypt, 
Libya, Yemen, Syria, and Bahrain varied. It “has been a mix of economic handouts, 
use of patronage, limited political and economic reforms as well as domestic 
repression and even military intervention” (Colombo 2012: 2). The reason for the 
varied responses can be attributed to different variables such as the geographical 
location of the countries experiencing uprising, the nature of the regime, and 
geopolitical interests of international community with the country concerned.  
The GCC’s response towards the countries that witnessed uprisings can be 
divided into two categories: countries outside the Gulf region and countries in the 
Gulf region. Nevertheless, there was also a clear-cut difference between all GCC 
countries on one hand and Qatar on the other. But there was no differing response 
between GCC members in the case of Bahrain. It is no hidden secret that since the 
accession of Sheikh Hamad Bin Khalifa Al Thani to power in 1995, Qatar has aimed 
at assuming a regional hegemonic role. In the case of Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, with all 
what the Kingdom represents in the GCC, stepped to grant asylum for the twenty-
three years rulers of Tunisia, Ben Ali and his kin. As for Egypt, the GCC countries 
called for stability and peace whilst offering support for Mubarak. Despite the support 
for the Ben Ali and Mubarak regimes, the “GCC partners, [along with] Saudi Arabia 
is now supporting certain political forces e.g., the Islamists that have gained power in 
Tunisia and in Egypt, with a view to maintain a favorable sectarian balance” 
(Colombo 2012: 12). As for the case of Yemen, a country in the Arabian Peninsula 
with the hope of becoming a member of the GCC, there was a call for the ousting of 
Ali Abdallah Saleh to avoid a Yemeni civil war. A civil war in Yemen could have 
major repercussions on the GCC states especially Saudi Arabia. Therefore, the 
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decision in Yemen was the removal of the head of state, Saleh, whilst ensuring regime 
maintenance. Nevertheless, the proactive role of Saudi Arabia in the countries which 
witnessed social unrest can be best described in the words of Brynen, Moore, 
Salloukh, & Zahar: 
Riyadh emerged as the Mecca of political asylums, providing refuge for 
Tunisia’s Ben Ali and Yemen’s Saleh. It pressured the United States not to let 
go of Mubarak, flexed its financial power to shield him from a humiliating 
debacle, and when all else failed it switched to a co-optation strategy to buy 
influence in Egypt’s new order. Similarly, it has scrambled to reorder the 
political deck in a manner that protects its political influence in a post-Saleh 
Yemen. Moreover, and in a move aimed at shielding nonoil monarchical 
regimes from the wave of popular uprisings, it led the drive to inject Bahrain 
and Oman with funds to buy political acquiescence (2012: 296). 
 
On the other hand, only in the cases of Libya and Syria did the GCC countries 
make the decision to support the rebellious movements. Supporting the rebellious 
movements in Libya a bit further than the other GCC countries, Qatar was the first 
Arab country to recognize the Libyan National Transitional Council. Sheikh Al Thani 
did not stop there; rather he made a decision as a major non-NATO ally to send 
around six fighter jets to Libya as a sign of support for NATO’s intervention (Roberts 
2011). Nevertheless, Doha’s financial and military support for the Libyan rebels can 
be best described as an attempt “to occupy regional leadership role Saudi Arabia 
abandoned in Libya to reserve for itself a privileged place in the good books of the 
United States” (Brynen, Moore, Salloukh, & Zahar 2012: 296). From a mobilized 
political and military action against the Colonel, the Emir launched the war of media 
against Qaddafi. Therefore, “to this end, Qatar, skillfully exploited Al Jazeera, the 
satellite broadcast based in Doha to rally the Arab public opinion in favor of the 
foreign intervention in Libya and of its own role as a key Arab player, a role 
commensurate to its wealth and clout” (Colombo 2012: 7). Similarly, in the case of 
Syria, the GCC states support till this day the Syrian aspirations for ousting Al-Assad. 
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Pleading support for the Syrian protestors’ demands to gain freedom, the GCC states 
recognized the Syrian National Council. Therefore, Qatar has publicly condemned the 
“regime’s [Syrian] bloody clampdown” against protestors and supported the armed 
revolt (Brynen, Moore, Salloukh, Zahar 2012: 296) whereas Saudi Arabia’s support 
for the Syrian rebellion “is governed by similar geopolitical calculations, intended to 
force regime change in Damascus to compensate for Riyadh’s loss of post- Saddam 
Iraq to Iran” (2012: 297). 
 
Table 4.2- Deaths in the Arab Awakening
5
 
 
 
Doran and Shaikh argue that “although riots and demonstrations have not been 
uncommon since the 1980s, Bahrain has entered a new era of instability fueled by a 
combination of long-standing grievances, the competition of regional powers, and 
transformative aspirations” (Doran and Shaikh in Pollack et al. 2011: 188). Therefore, 
when social uprisings erupted in the Persian Gulf in 2011, in Bahrain, fears of a 
growing Bahraini Shiite-Iranian crescent of support mounted. Bahrain, along with the 
                                                        
5
 The Economist (July 14, 2011) “Price of Protest, so Far”. Retrieved from 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/dailychart/2011/07/arab-spring-death-toll 
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five countries that witnessed social unrest, has been listed as one of the countries with 
high death totals during civilian-security clashes (refer to Table 4.2). The uprising in 
Manama was crushed by blood and sword. With the al-Khalifa request for help from 
Saudi Arabia, the Saudi intervention in Bahrain can be similarly depicted to the 
Soviet Union bloody squash of Hungarian protests in 1956. Therefore, the Saudi 
intervention cannot by all means be justified; it was not a humanitarian intervention 
rather it was for the maintenance of the Shiite-fearing al-Khalifa regime with a more 
general Arabian Peninsula fear of mounting Iranian influence. On the other hand, 
“while Bahrain is often depicted as a majority Shiite country ruled by a Sunni 
monarchy, the country’s politics should not be viewed as flowing from a mere 
religious divide” (Brynen, Moore, Salloukh, & Zahar 2012: 80). Accordingly, Doran 
and Shaikh argue that there is no if not few evidence corresponding to the 
contemplation of Bahraini Shiites for Persian leadership and orders (Pollack et al. 
2011). In most of the Middle Eastern cases, what starts as a call for freedom and 
liberty usually ends up as a religious divide. Nevertheless, “the al-Khalifas’ fear of 
Iranian hegemony and Tehran’s ability to galvanize Bahrain’s majority Shi’i 
population stem from a long-standing, and oft-deserved, suspicion of Iran” (Doran 
and Shaikh in Pollack et al. 2011: 191). Unlike in the case of Oman, Qatar, the United 
Arab Emirates, and Kuwait, the Saudi and Bahraini “Shiite communities are 
politically, economically, and socially marginalized and they are often portrayed by 
the government as a threat to social cohesion and national stability” (Colombo 2012: 
11). 
The Gulf Cooperation Council was formed in 1981 with the purpose of 
establishing political and economic cooperation among the Gulf States. Nevertheless, 
with mounting security fears in 1984, the Peninsula Shield Force of the GCC was 
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formed. The only intervention made by the Peninsula Shield Force against an external 
threat was in 1990-1991 when the Iraqi–Kuwaiti war occurred. Nevertheless, it is 
worth noting that “always fearful of Iran’s regional ascendancy, GCC countries have 
grown increasingly uncomfortable with the Islamic Republic’s outreach and influence 
after the United States’ toppling of the Taliban in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein in 
Iraq” (Colombo 2012: 2). However, it was in 2011 that the Peninsula Shield Force, 
stationed in Saudi Arabia, made its first intervention in the internal affairs of a Gulf 
state for the maintenance of peace. Upon the request of the al-Khalifa monarchy of 
Bahrain, the Shield Force crossed King Fahd Causeway, a concrete connection that 
connects Bahrain to Saudi Arabia, for the rescue of the Sunni ruling family of 
Bahrain.  Therefore, between fears of regime change in a Gulf monarchy and the 
spread of Iranian influence, “Saudi Arabia’s fear of Iran’s growing geopolitical power 
played an instrumental role in the former’s military intervention in Bahrain and the 
consequent annihilation of a genuinely cross-sectarian democratic movement 
demanding the establishment of a constitutional monarchy to replace minority Sunni 
rule” (Brynen, Moore, Salloukh, & Zahar 2012: 297). 
 
4.5- Lingering Tension 
“If Bahrain is supposed to be integrated into another country, it must be 
Iran and not Saudi Arabia.” 
 -Ali Larijani, Iranian Parliament Speaker - May 2012 
 
 
Weighing regime stability over populist aspirations, “the Arab world’s 
geostrategic location and its place in the global capitalist economy have long played 
in favor of authoritarian regimes” (Brynen, Moore, Salloukh, & Zahar 2012: 297). 
The maintenance of the oil-rich Gulf regime in Bahrain was viewed as crucial for the 
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avoidance of a wave of populist discontent across the Gulf countries. Taking the lead 
in defending the ruling family of Bahrain, “Saudi Arabia’s strong advocacy for the 
use of GCC forces in Bahrain, [has allowed] many [to] see Riyadh as a 
counterrevolutionary agent in the Bahraini context and more broadly in the Arab 
Spring” (Pollack et al. 2011: 192).  
 
       
Figure 4.1- Map of the Persian Gulf
6
 
 
With a presence in the Gulf since World War two, “the American military has 
served as the main guarantor of Bahrain’s security at least since the two countries 
signed a Defense Cooperation Agreement in 1991, and [arguably] well before” 
(Doran and Shaikh in Pollack et al. 2011: 193). Home for the U.S. Naval forces since 
1947, “Bahrain […] provides the head-quarters for the U.S. Navy’s Fifth fleet, 
responsible for defending the Gulf, the Red Sea, the Arabian Sea, and the East coast 
of Africa” (Doran and Shaikh in Pollack et al. 2011: 194). Despite the strategic 
importance of Bahrain to the United States, “the tactics of American policy in the 
Gulf region have varied over time, shifting with changes in the world strategic picture 
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 Map retrieved from Pars Times, www.parstimes.com/persian-gulf 
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and with changes in the regional politics of the Middle East and the Gulf region” 
(Gause 2004: 120). Nevertheless, Gause argues that “American liberals have always 
been wary of the strong U.S.-Saudi relationship, as part of their general suspicion of 
U.S. allies who are undemocratic and do not meet American standards on human 
rights and women’s rights” (2004: 72). Therefore, the United States and the European 
Union have maintained friendly relations with the Gulf in order to maintain the 
continuous flow of geopolitical and economic interests; however, their relationship 
falls within the category of friends with shared interests yet with a maintained 
distance. The reaction of the international community to the uprising in Manama 
proved that “the prompt repression of the Bahraini revolt and the GCC’s activism on 
other Arab Spring fronts such as Libya and Syria has freed the West from the 
incumbency to have to intervene in the Gulf, jeopardizing its well established 
relations with the Gulf regimes” (Colombo 2012: 13) 
Within a month of the start of the uprising in Bahrain, the Saudi intervention 
stifled “a harsh sectarian crackdown against protestors in Bahrain [which] risked 
sparking a new regional proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran” (Lynch 2012: 9). 
To date, due to the “lack [… of] a shared understanding of the region’s strategic 
outlook, latent tensions between the GCC and Iran have persisted” and will continue 
to linger (Colombo 2012: 11).  
With Iran placed on the list of the axis of evil in Washington, the United 
States could not jeopardize its relations with its Gulf allies through a direct military 
intervention because “as oil market remains an integrated world market, production 
and pricing decisions in the Gulf States would directly affect oil for all customers 
around the world” (Gause 2004: 65). On the other hand, Saudi Arabia, which is 
connected to Bahrain not only through the Causeway but also through royal 
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marriages, could not risk having a successful regime change in a Gulf monarchy in 
fear of a domino effect and of an Iranian expanded influence. The post-Arab Spring 
Iranian influence across the Middle East has been seen evident in the improvement of 
Tehran’s relations with the post-Mubarak regime in Egypt (Colombo 2012). 
Therefore, once again, the geopolitical and security interests have superseded the 
aspirations of reform for the sake of regime stability and maintenance.  
 
4.6- Conclusion 
Security and oil remains the bond that keeps GCC-US relations vibrant.  
Nevertheless, what Gause argued for eight years ago remains valid because “the core 
of the relationship between the United States and the GCC states remain oil, and the 
centrality of the Gulf to the future energy needs of both the United States and the 
world as a whole will continue to keep the US-GCC relationship at the top of the 
American agenda” (Gause 2004: 64). Therefore, energy security will remain a vital 
aspect of U.S. strategy in the Middle East (Luciani 2013). If there is a failure of the 
Arab Spring then, “to date, the greatest failure of the Arab Spring is Bahrain” 
(Colombo 2012: 13).  
Just as Libya acts as an important and strategic gateway in North Africa, we 
cannot ignore the fact that taking a look ahead, “the future of the Arab world may 
hinge on this Island [Bahrain] whose prospects today are bleak and whose small size 
conceals its importance to broader regional and global balances” (Colombo 2012: 13).  
This chapter argued that the GCC under the auspices of Saudi Arabia, 
intervened on March 14
th
, a month after the eruption of the social uprising in Bahrain 
for two main reasons.  The first reason for silencing the Bahraini discontent and 
maintaining al-Khalifa’s regime is because simply none of the Gulf regimes can 
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accept a regime change in a Gulf monarchy. The need for isolating the Peninsula from 
the waves of Arab discontent -ensuring regime stability- was of greater importance 
than any democratic aspirations.  The second reason had a more indirect justification 
and that is to crush any attempted Iranian influence in the region. Moreover, the 
chapter examined the United States’ policy towards the Gulf. The policy has been to 
maintain a friendly relationship; however, a distant one with the monarchies of the 
Gulf. The reason is because aside from risking its relationship with the Gulf 
monarchies, a projected United States led-interference would have been disruptive for 
the country’s image and would have shed lights on its relation with its non-democratic 
allies. Therefore, between geostrategic interests of the Gulf monarchies and the 
maintenance of the flow of oil, the decision was to have a direct military intervention 
in Bahrain guided by Saudi Arabia to protect the al-Khalifa regime.  
The next chapter will conclude in a comparative and analytical approach the 
variations in the role of external dynamics in light of the Arab Spring in the two case 
studies, Libya and Bahrain. The chapter will assess the dimension and implication of 
the varied external response in the outcome of popular uprisings, which can result in 
either regime maintenance or breakdown. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION 
“The storm of unrest that spread from the Atlantic to the Persian Gulf 
may have subsided, at least in some parts of the region, but its story has 
just begun […] the result is that the Middle East will never be the 
same”- Kenneth Pollack 
 
5.1-  Summing Up 
This thesis has assessed the important impact of external variables on political 
transition outcomes. In pre-Arab Spring literature, focus has been on the importance 
of tackling questions of authoritarian resilience and the importance of providing 
remedies to Middle Eastern exceptionalism with no concrete consideration for a cure. 
It is true that “historical precedents do shape our assumptions about current events” 
(Behr 2012: 13); however, after the Arab Spring, the theories of exceptionalism are 
refuted once and for all. An overlooked variable in the study of democratic transitions 
has been the role of external variables - a double-edged sword that can shift political 
transition towards regime maintenance or regime breakdown. 
Many scholars have argued against the use of the term Spring as a depiction of 
the 17 December snowballed events of the Arab world. Describing the events of 2010 
as “intifada”, “nahda”, “sahwa”, and “thawra” reflected respectively as uprising, 
renaissance, awakening, and revolution, offers more justice to the demanded 
democratic aspirations of the Arab youth (Khouri 2011). The term Spring was used to 
describe the 1968 Czechoslovakia and the Springtime of Nations in 1848 of Europe. 
Unfortunately, both movements of 1968 and 1848 collapsed within a year of their 
attempted revolts. However, to describe events in the Middle East, the term Spring 
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was used by various U.S. conservatives to describe the 2005 movements in Middle 
East, particularly Lebanon (Keating 2011).  
With incessantly repeated terminologies in the study of the Middle East such 
as democracy and democratization, there are various questions to be addressed in a 
post-Arab Spring MENA. Is there a possibility of witnessing democracy or 
democratization in the Arab world? And “is it these popular struggles and the 
responses they trigger from local, regional, and international actors that will 
determine the future of authoritarianism and the potential for democracy in the Arab 
world?” (Brynen, Moore, Salloukh, & Zahar 2012: 301). Has the role of external 
variables in democratic transitions been overlooked to the extent that it cannot be 
excluded from study of MENA after the Arab Spring?  
This chapter will assess in a comparative approach the implications of the role 
of external dynamics on the outcome of social uprisings in both studied cases, Libya 
and Bahrain. The chapter will also explain the importance of bringing back the role of 
external variables in the study of democratic transitions as an important paradigm in 
the study of the Middle East. 
 
5.2-  The Eschatology of the Arab Spring 
“Does Big Brother exist? 
Of course he exists. The Party exists. Big Brother is the embodiment of 
the Party. Does he exist in the same way as I exist? 
You do not exist” 
- George Orwell, 1984 
 
“At the crossroads of Europe, Asia, and Africa, the Middle East is where a big 
part of the world comes together” (Pollack et al. 2011: 279). Despite vast literature 
emphasizing the problems and impediments of Arab world democratization, “no 
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academic specialist on the Middle East (of whom I am aware) predicted the timing 
and extent of the region-wide upheavals in the Arab world that began in December 
2010 and continue to day” (Gause 2011: 11). A swift examination of the Arab Spring 
reveals that “[it] so far toppled some authoritarian regimes, pitted others in bloody 
conflicts with their societies, forced some to accommodate or co-opt popular 
demands, and in the process sent tremors throughout the theoretical edifice that 
students of Arab politics assembled to explain authoritarian persistence” (Brynen, 
Moore, Salloukh, & Zahar 2012: 287). Moreover, in most cases,  “it often happens 
that the revolutionaries who sacrificed themselves are then dismayed to see their 
hopes dashed while a new order that is as bad as, if not worse than, the one they 
ousted becomes reality” (Bradley 2012: 2). The most successful aspect of the Arab 
Spring is that “[it] made clear […] that the old ways of buying the silence of the 
opposition through patronage and corruption might not work forever” (Colombo 
2012: 13). The major challenge facing Middle Eastern regimes now is the schism 
between the old and the new, youth generation, who are in demand for new 
definitions of political leadership, economic development, and social justice. 
Therefore, the disenchantment between the ruler and the ruled is growing vastly in the 
MENA region. 
It is no coincidence that the spark of the Arab Spring began from Tunisia’s 
Sidi Bouzid as a call for dignity and freedom. In reference to Figure 5.1, the Jasmine 
Revolution protestors have called for Bourguiba’s modern Tunisia. Nevertheless, 
similar to the case of Tunisia, Arab Spring protestors in other countries have used 
symbolic indications referring to their post-independence period as a reflection of 
their demand for freedom and liberation. Almost every Arab Spring protestor had a 
Bourguiba-like idol, symbol, or cause. Moreover, “no one could have predicted that 
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the match struck by Mohammed Bouazizi to set himself afire in Sidi Bouzid on 
December 17, 2010, would ignite the entire Arab world, but the kindling had been 
laid and was there for all to see years before” (Pollack et al. 2011: 3). Nevertheless, 
when the events in the Middle East erupted, the international community at large 
stood in perplexity because “the rapid pace of internal change tends to out-run the 
decision-making capacity of most external actors” (Whitehead 1996, p. 40). 
 
 
Figure 5.1- Habib Bourguiba Mausoleum in Monastir with encryptions in 
Arabic: “the Supreme Combatant, the Builder of Modern Tunisia, the 
Liberator of Women”7 
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 As described by Abigail Hole in his 2007 book “Tunisia” and image is retrieved from www.photos-
voyages.com/mausoleum-door.html 
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Between political liberalization and aspects of democratization lies a 
fundamental distinction; however, the long history of examining the Middle Eastern 
regimes has been crammed with vast misinterpretations. The aroma of repeated 
elections, lessened media restrictions, and advanced social freedoms has contributed 
to the misinterpreted liberalizing image of the Middle East. But do all these 
methodical contributions enhance authoritarian regimes’ legitimacy? When 
legitimacy is lost, the regime uses its sole technique: the usage of coercive measures 
to preserve itself.  Nevertheless, the side on which the external coercive measures are 
used for support can tip the outcome either towards regime breakdown or regime 
preservation. It has been evident that the factor of legitimacy has been lost in all the 
Arab states, which witnessed social uprisings. Despite the dominated neo-patrimonial 
and co-optation systems of power in the Middle East, legitimacy is a crucial factor to 
be looked upon because “even in cases such as Castro’s Cuba, Saddam’s Iraq, or the 
Soviet Union under Stalin, there are clear indicators of political rulers trying to gain 
and maintain at least some measure of political legitimacy” (Albrecht and 
Schlumberger 2004: 372).  
After the Arab Spring, the major debates have shifted towards political 
transitions, the outcome of social movements, and who answered the exceptional 
arguments of Middle Eastern authoritarianism correctly. The major arguments 
revolving around the resilient authoritarian regimes of the Middle East can be 
summarized into three key categories: Islam, oil, and repressive mechanisms. 
Nevertheless, the eighteen-year ago arguments of Michael Hudson and Lisa Anderson 
on the importance of the political cultural approach and Michael Herb’s importance of 
family coalition have been proven falsifiable after the Arab Spring. Recent arguments 
have resonated with the fact that with the exception of Bahrain, the major social 
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uprisings have not occurred in monarchies, the oil-rich countries of the Middle East 
have been capable of repressing political turmoil. What about the case of Libya? The 
case of Libya, an oil-rich country, is exceptional to this argument due to NATO’s 
decisive intervention. If it were not for NATO, Qaddafi’s forces would have been 
capable of ending the social discontent. Qaddafi followed Stalin’s approach of 
emasculating and politicizing the military because of growing distrust of the armed 
forces. Forming personalized military battalions, controlled by his sons, Qaddafi was 
capable of holding on to power for 42 years. Nevertheless, the violent replacement of 
regimes is not a new theme in Arab politics. The first theorization of this common 
theme has been by, the Tunisian philosopher, Ibn Khaldun. With fear barriers 
shattered in a momentous Arab discontent, Ibn Khaldun discussed the reasons behind 
the up-rage of the masses some 600 years ago: 
Good rulership is equivalent to mildness. If the ruler uses force and is ready to 
mete out punishment and eager to expose the faults of people and to count 
their sins, [his subjects] become fearful and depressed and seek to protect 
themselves against him through lies, ruses, and deceit… They often abandon 
[the ruler] on the battlefield and fail to support his defensive enterprises… The 
subjects often conspire to kill the ruler. Thus the dynasty decays, and the fence 
that protects it lies in ruins (Ibn Khaldun 1958: chapter VI, section 22).
8
 
 
Therefore, use of coercion leads to a reciprocal reaction and when the regime losses 
its veil of legitimacy, the countdown of regime survival begins. 
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 Al Muqaddimah was initially written as part of a book in 1377. 
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5.3- Impact of Varied Variables 
 
Table 5.1- Results of Interaction between Internal and External Variables on Regime 
Outcome 
 
Internal variable (populist 
appeal towards regime) 
 
External Variable 
 
Outcome (for regime) 
Support Oppose Will Vary 
Oppose Support Survival 
Support Support Survival 
Oppose Oppose Breakdown 
 
After the Arab Spring, the role of external dynamics of democratization 
cannot be sidelined anymore. Having the external variable as the independent variable 
leaves regime breakdown or maintenance as the dependent variable. The relationship 
between the independent and dependent variables is not uni-causal, however. 
Operationalizing a number of variables such as oil, geopolitical location, alliances, 
and foreign policy, the extent and rate of external impetus dominates the outcome. As 
Table 5.1 shows, the case of Libya falls into the last category of oppose-oppose-
breakdown. While the Libyan protestors demanded the ousting of Qaddafi along with 
his regime, NATO’s engineered intervention under the banner of humanitarian 
assistance was critical to leading to regime breakdown in Libya. On the other hand, 
the case of Bahrain falls into the second category of oppose-support-survival. Today, 
modest demonstrations occur in Bahrain, whether on the second year anniversary of 
the uprising or couple of weeks before the start of Formula One races in Manama. 
Nevertheless, the regional intervention led by GCC under auspices of Saudi Arabia 
with a United States approval was the determinative factor in al-Khalifa’s regime 
maintenance and survival. 
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Despite the fact that “only a handful of regimes in the Middle East have so far 
fallen to the wave of the popular unrest that has swept the region” (Pollack et al. 
2011: 141), there are four implications that can be derived as an outcome of the 
interaction between internal and external variables on regime outcomes. As Table 5.1 
makes clear, Libya and Bahrain fall respectively within the oppose-oppose-
breakdown and the oppose-support-survival models. Moreover, the support-oppose 
scenario will need further investigation in order to determine its impact on regime 
outcomes. As for the support-support case, the standardized outcome is for regime 
survival since both variables positively reinforce regime maintenance. As argued in 
previous chapters, the role of external factor has a fundamental impact on the process 
of transition, which can lead to regime breakdown or regime maintenance. Facing a 
regime breakdown in Libya, the regime change experienced in post-Qaddafi era is an 
initial step in the process of transition. Comparing the case of Libya to other countries 
that witnessed conflict such as Afghanistan and Iraq, “the fall of the old regime is 
only the first step in a political transition” (Al Turk in Pollack et al. 2011: 121). In the 
case of Bahrain, the process of transition did not even begin; it faced the impeding 
coercive measures taken by regime with support of regional forces.  
Table 5.2 provides an assessment of the implications of the Arab Spring whilst 
highlight the variations that can be derived from it. The major implications in relation 
to the Arab Spring countries can be summed in four models. In the case of Yemen, as 
argued in chapter four, the ousting of Ali Abdullah Saleh did not lead to a regime 
breakdown, but rather power was retained by the pre-uprising apparatus. As for 
regime breakdown, the cases of Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya fall within this category. 
Nevertheless, in the cases of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, the minor uprisings that 
occurred were met with coercive measures taken by regime, thus uprisings were 
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merely short lived. Moreover, in the case of Bahrain, the uprising was similarly 
crushed with assistance from the Peninsula Shield Force. As for the on-going civil 
war in Syria, there is yet to be a definitive outcome. To date, there is neither regime 
breakdown nor can it be said that there is regime survival. 
 
Table 5.2- Assessing Implications of the Arab Spring 
 
# 
 
Assessing Implications of the  
Arab Spring 
 
 
Arab Spring Countries 
1 Power is retained by pre-uprising apparatus 
 
Yemen 
2 Regime survival through repression (with/ without 
support of international/regional forces) 
 
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait 
3 Neither regime breakdown nor regime survival Syria 
4 Regime Breakdown 
 
Libya, Egypt, Tunisia 
 
Moreover, an important aspect to be assessed after the Arab Spring is the role 
of the United States. Pollack argue that “while these revolutions were not made in 
America, American actions may have an outside impact, perhaps even on their 
ultimate success or failure” (Pollack et al. 2011: 1). The United States sidelined itself 
from a leading role whereby “open endorsement of regime change was reserved for, 
respectively, unpredictable and undervalued dictators such as Qaddafi or geopolitical 
opponents such as Syria” (Brynen, Moore, Salloukh, & Zahar 2012: 298). Despite the 
fact that many have criticized the policies of the Obama administration in the wake of 
the Arab Spring, “yet by muddling through and insisting on keeping the United States 
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on the right side of history throughout the course of the Arab revolutions, the Obama 
administration has ensured that the new regimes in the region will have to continue to 
work with the United States, and ensured that the U.S. is not diverted from its 
overriding strategic reorientation towards the Asia-Pacific” (Kitchen 2012: 53). In 
other words, the reason the United States has been cautiously sidelining itself is 
because “[it] has had to tread a fine line between support for its values - and what it 
conceives as its long term interests - represented by political reform in the region, and 
the protection of what it perceives as its core regional interests” (Kitchen 2012: 57). 
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Figure 5.2- Regional and International Military and Humanitarian Contribution in 
Libya and Bahrain
9
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 The data in the designed map is retrieved from Task Force (2012) “Can NATO react to the Arab 
Spring?” The Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, pp. 1-301 
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5.4-  The Curse of Sisyphus  
“Where would his torture be, indeed, if at every step the hope of 
succeeding upheld him? - Albert Camus,  
Algerian-French Philosopher and Journalist,  
The Myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays, 1942 
 
Despite the fact that many may argue that the events of 2011 are not yet 
stories of democratic transition, “more than anything else, the Arab Spring has been 
about a yearning for democracy” (Pollack et al. 2011: 21). Two years after the 
occurrence of the uprisings, “enough time has passed to try to make sense of what has 
happened so far and, perhaps, gain an inkling of where the region is headed” (Pollack 
et al. 2011: 1). Scholars and practitioners will debate the impact of the Arab Spring 
for years to come, with old and new questions addressed and revisited.  
Sisyphus was condemned to ceaselessly and incessantly rolling a rock to the 
top of the mountain, which in turn, kept on rolling back due to its own encumbrance - 
a dreadful punishment that is futilely hopeless. However, Sisyphus’s fate belongs to 
him and his rock is but of his own. Comparing the role of external dynamics of 
democratization in the Middle East to the curse of Sisyphus is a metaphorical 
symbolization of the Middle Eastern fate. The destiny of the Middle East in the 
aftermath of the Arab Spring belongs to the people and the Middle Eastern rock is 
their own. Arabs of course are not immune to democratization and “if the people of 
the Middle East could have their way, all of the states there would morph into 
democracies overnight” (Pollack et al. 2011: 87). Therefore, the mere fact that the 
Arab Spring, an exceptional phenomenon in the Middle East, occurred is a cause of 
optimism. When studying the MENA, scholars and practitioners should examine it 
with the lens of possible democratic transitions. Assessing impact of December 2010 
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events in a comparative manner on great powers and Middle Eastern countries, 
Pollack argues: 
The impact of the Arab Spring has been particularly profound for the great 
powers of the world, both the established and the emerging. Because the 
Middle East has been important for a long time, the established great powers 
have had interests in the Middle East for similarly long periods, including eras 
when parts of the Middle East were under their formal or informal control. 
Consequently, they have vested interests in the region, which are being 
threatened, reshaped, or even benefitted by the events of the Arab Spring - and 
often some unknowable combination of the three. What is more, the people of 
the Middle East, both rulers and ruled, are looking at the great powers- 
especially to the more established great powers with which they have been 
dealing with for decades - to help them. And of course, the help that the rulers 
want is often the diametric opposite of what their people want (Pollack et al. 
2011: 277). 
 
What the Middle East has witnessed in terms of “exceptionally rapid, intense, 
and nearly simultaneous explosion of popular protest […] united by a shared 
transnational media and bound by a common identity” (Lynch 2012: 9) contributes to 
scholarly debates concerning the global and regional impact of the Arab Spring. There 
will be many threats and impediments in a post-Bouazizi Arab world, and “the first, 
and most obvious, threat to new Arab democracies is that they will be hijacked by 
individuals or groups looking to take power, hold on to it, and rule autocratically, all 
with the help of the veneer of legitimacy conferred by elections” (Pollack et al. 2011: 
90). Nevertheless, addressing the importance of external dynamics as a mode of 
democratic transition can no longer be ignored after the Arab Spring. The Arab 
Spring demonstrated the role played by external dynamics in authoritarian regime 
breakdown or maintenance. In the case of Bahrain and Libya, there will be major 
challenges to address. In a post-Qaddafi era, Libya has to engage in constructive 
building of state institutions whereas in case of Bahrain, al-Khalifa regime cannot 
sideline the importance of addressing power-sharing formulas between regime and 
society. 
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